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WILLIAM CROSSKEY AND THE
COMMON LAW
by Larry Arnhart*
It is remarkable that William Crosskey's massive work on the Constitution" is today almost totally neglected.
In 1953 his book was
reviewed in most of the major law journals and in many newspapers and
literary publications. 2 Although many of the reviews were favorable,8
some were quite hostile. Apparently the adverse reviews-particularly
those by Henry M. Hart, 4 Ernest Brown,5 Julius Goebel, 6 and Charles
Fairman7 -were influential enough to create a pervasive impression
among lawyers and legal historians that Crosskey's arguments had
been thoroughly discredited.8
* B.A., University of Dallas; M.A., University of Chicago; candidate for Ph.D., University of Chicago.
1. W. CRossanY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTrUrIoN IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNiTED

(1953) [hereinafter cited as CRossKEY].
2. The two volume work, simultaneously published, was reviewed in twenty-eight law
journals and fifteen non-legal publications.
3. See, e.g., Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of EireTomkins, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 24 (1953); Dean, Book Review, 40 A.B.A.J. 314 (1954);
Jeffrey, Book Review, 131A. L. REv. 638 (1953); Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 439 (1954); Yntema, Book Review, 2 AM. J. COM. L. 582 (1953).
Although they have sometimes disagreed with him, Malcolm Sharp and George
Anastaplo have been perhaps the most persistent exponents of Crosskey's views. See G.
ANAsTAPLO, THE CoNSrrrutnoNALisT 112-13, 136-42, 453, 530, 567-68, 582, 604, 716-17
(1971) [hereinafter cited as ANASTAPLO]; Sharp, The Master, 35 U. CmL L. REv. 238
(1968); Sharp, The Old Constitution, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 529 (1953); Crosskey,
Anastaplo & Meiklejohn on the United States Constitution, U. Cm. LAw SCHOOL RECORD,
Spring, 1973, at 3.
4. Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HRv.L. REv. 1456 (1954).
5. Brown, Book Review, 67 HRv.L. Rlv. 1439 (1954).
6. Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. RaV. 450 (1954) hereinafter cited as Ex
Parte Clio].
7. Fairman, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. Cm. L. REv.40 (1953).
8. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, in
BE NcHMAmS, 165-66 nn.51-52 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Friendly]; Jeffrey, American
Legal History 1952-1954, in 1954 AINuAL SuRvEY OF AvmmcAN LAw 866; Katz,
William Winslow Crosskey, U. Cm. LAw SCHOOL RECORD, Summer, 1972, at 20-21.
An illustration of the influence of the reviews attacking Crosskey is the following
comment in a review of a book that relied greatly on Crosskey's work: "All things
considered, Crosskey must be taken with a great deal of caution. Reviews of his book
indicate that original research is desirable. I do not know whether Bozell has read these
SrATES
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My intention is to cast doubt upon this unfavorable view of Crosskey
and to argue that his work deserves more serious attention from students

and scholars of the Constitution than it has received up to now. In
particular, I shall examine Crosskey's thesis concerning the adoption of
the common law in America in light of the criticisms made by Julius
Goebel in his famous book review.9 If I succeed in showing that this
small but important part of Crosskey's book can survive the unfriendly

scrutiny of one of America's most prominent legal historians, then it
could justifiably be concluded that his book is more formidable than has

usually been thought.
Crosskey contends that by the time of the American Revolution, the
English common law, except for those parts that were inapplicable to

colonial conditions, was the general uniform law of the colonies as a
whole.

The constitutional or statutory "reception provisions" enacted

by the states after 1776 recognized the continued existence of the
common law as the general law of America although the imperfect
union of the states under the Articles of Confederation prevented the

effective application of this law. The Constitution, by establishing a
vigorous national government, vivified this pre-existing common law as
one of "the Laws of the United States," as stated in Article II, section
2.10
book reviews." B. BOZELL, THE WARREN REVOLUION (1966), reviewed, 3 INTERCOLLEGIATB REVmW 195 (1967).
As a possible explanation of the success of the unfavorable reviews, Grant Gilmore
suggests "Crosskey was not without his defenders but, naturally, the favorable reviews
were written in bland terms of general approval; the unfavorable reviews went in for
detailed infighting." Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of
Troubles, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 475, 486 n.21 (1972).
9. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6. The respect for this review among legal scholars is
exemplified in David Flaherty's citation of it with the following comment:
His lifelong battle to uphold the highest standards for the study of legal history
has resulted in some devastating reviews, which are recommended reading for any
scholar who may become smug in his growing knowledge of this field.
Flaherty, An Introduction to Early American Legal History, in EssAys IN THE HISTORY
oF EARLY AMERlCAN LAw 11 & n.14 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969) [Introduction will hereinafter be cited as Flaherty. The collection of essays will hereinafter be cited as EssAYS IN
THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMEImcAN LAW]. See also J.Sm,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON
Tm DE VELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSnTTIoNs 7 (1965).
For a critique of Goebel's review, see Petro, Crosskey and The Constitution: A Reply
to Goebel, 53 MICH. L. Rnv. 312 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Petro]. Petro's essay is
useful although it is somewhat flawed by excessive adulation of Crosskey; he believes, for
example, that Crosskey's argumentation is so cogent that it "admits of no doubt of the

accuracy of the things he says, since he selects unimpeachable, authoritative witnesses,
and then lets them speak for themselves." Id. at 319.
10. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ... ." U.S. CONSr. art. 111, § 2.
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Crosskey uses this theory of the American adoption of the common
law to buttress the general thesis of his entire work-that the Constitution grants Congress "a general national legislative authority,"" which
makes it supreme over both the state governments and the other
branches of the national government. He infers that Congress possesses
"a general judicial-rule-making power" in that it is empowered to make
all laws "necessary and proper" for executing all the powers vested by
the Constitution in the national government.' 2 This includes, of course,
the judicial power of Article I.
Americans in the eighteenth century, Crosskey explains, thought that
such legislative control of the courts was necessary so that judicial
discretion could be restricted by statutory "rules of decision,""' thereby
preserving the Lockean principle of legislative supremacy, according to
which the power of making laws is the supreme power in a state.' 4
Therefore, Crosskey concludes, the powers of the federal judiciary and
Congress are intertwined: if the authority of the federal courts extends to matters of common law, then the authority of Congress, in the
exercise of its judicial-rule-making power, must be co-extensive with the
common law, which entails a general legislative power.',
But is it true that legislative supremacy is fully compatible with a
national common law? Or, rather, is it not the case that they conflict
with one another because they represent conflicting theories of law?
Crosskey notes the problem without drawing attention to it, when he
reports that the various forms of world-wide law that were presumed to
be parts of the common law could be abrogated by the sovereign
legislative power of any nation.' 6 According to the traditional conception of law, the common law is superior to statutory law because the
common law is derived from natural law, whereas statutes are only acts
11. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 363.
12. Id. at 504-05. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that Congress shall have
power:

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
13. I CRoss.FY, supra note 1, at 522.
14. II id. at 1325 n.25.
15. I id. at 558-62. That Crosskey's interpretation of the Constitution would allow, if
not require, both the Supreme Court and Congress to exercise wide powers with
reference to the common law is evident in his attack on Erie R.R. ev.Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1937). H CaossnnY, supra note 1, at 902-37. See Friendly, supra note 8; Keffe, In
Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The True National Common Law," 18 AM.

U.L. Rnv. 316 (1969).
16. I CossgnY, supra note 1, at 576-77.
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of will. "Common law rules are discovered, statutes are made." But
the Lockean theory of legislative supremacy depends upon the modem
conception of law, according to which all laws are made by a sovereign
will. 7 It has been argued that although the modem view of law
became the prevailing theory of American jurisprudence in the early
part of the nineteenth century, near the end of the eighteenth century the
modem and traditional theories existed simultaneously, creating some
ambiguity in jurisprudential theory.'
A similar ambiguity appears in Crosskey's theory of the American
common law. Although Crosskey's work is dominated by legal positivism,' 9 which is consistent with his advocacy of national legislative
sovereignty for Congress, he has great difficulty in trying to explain the
American adoption of the English common law without relying on the
traditional theory of the common law as the law that is not derived from
the acts of a sovereign legislature.
In evaluating Crosskey's theory of the adoption of the common law,
as well as Goebel's critique of the theory, it might ,be useful to consider
first Crosskey's view in comparison with other leading theories of early
American law. Therefore, the first part of this article shall survey and
assess three of the most prominent theories, and then analyze Crosskey's
position within the context of the continuing controversy as to the nature
of the law in early America.
The second part of this paper will study Goebel's book review with
attempts being made at every point to answer his criticisms in a manner
consistent with Crosskey's text. Goebers general argument will be seen
to rest on the problem just mentioned, for he cites the manifest diversity
17. The conflict between traditional and modem theories of law is surveyed in A.
PASSERiN D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAw (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as D'ENTREVEs];
L. STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISToRY (1953). A study of the conflict from the
perspective of a legal positivist can be found in H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 391-418 (1945) [hereinafter cited as KELSEN]. See notes 36, 99, 114, 130,

174, 225 infra.
18. I CROSSKEE,

supra note 1, at 568-69, 576-77; Horwitz, The Emergence of an
PERSPECTvEs IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 285, 295 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). In studying the conflict in early
America between the traditional and the modem theories of law, I have depended greatly
on Horwitz's monograph and on G. WoOD, THE CREATING OF TlE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1789, at 291-305, 456-62 (1969).
19. See notes 37-40, 97, 99, 131-32, 224-25 infra and accompanying text. Exposi-

Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5

tions of legal positivism may be found in J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE

(1885); KELSEN, note 17 supra; H. HART, THE CONCEPT
D'ENTRBVES, note 17 supra at 174-78.

OF

LAW (1961).

See also
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in the legal practice both of the colonies and of the states under the
Articles of Confederation to refute Crosskey's view of the American
common law as a uniform national law. How could the common law
emerge out of the varied legal systems of early America to become a
single law for the whole country? That is the question that Goebel
poses to Crosskey. It should be emphasized that at times the cogency of
Goebel's criticisms will be conceded since the purpose of this article is
not to defend all of Crosskey's arguments as completely sound, but to
show that they always merit our closest study, even when we find them
dubious. Therefore, they cannot be as easily dismissed as Goebel seems
20
to think.
I.

THEORIES OF THE COMMON LAW IN EARLY AMERICA

Most students of American colonial legal history would probably
accept the following sketch of the history of the English common law in
the colonies.21 The original colonial charters generally contained one or
both of two kinds of clauses pertaining to English law. One stated that
the settlers possessed the rights of Englishmen, and the other required
that the laws made by the chartered company or proprietors be consonant with English law insofar as it was applicable to colonial conditions
Yet despite these provisions in the charters, colonial laws diverged
greatly from English law during the early history of the colonies. The
leniency of the English authorities permitted it, and the peculiar circumstances of colonial life demanded it. Nevertheless, even during the early
years the colonists applied some elements of the common law, usually
without the procedural technicalities of English law. As English law20. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 451: "Let it be said at once that Mr. Crosskey's
performance, measured by even the least exacting of scholarly standards, is in the
reviewer's opinion without merit."
Goebel shows his disdain for Crosskey's work by not even mentioning Crosskey's book
in J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES (1971) [herein-

after cited as GOEBEL]. See Horwitz, Book Review, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1076, 1081-82
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Horwitz].
21. See GOEBEL, supra note 20, at 1-8; R. MoRRs, STmUDs IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY
AMERICAN LAW 17-21 (1930) [hereinafter cited as STUDIES IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW];
Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, 68 MASS. HIST. Soc'Y PROCEEDINGS 132

(1952), reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAw, supra note 9, at
53, 55-60 [hereinafter cited as Chafee]. Flaherty, supra note 9, at 3-4; Morris,
Foreword to LAw AND AUTHORITy IN COLONIAL AMERICA vii-xi (G. Billias ed. 1970)
[Foreword will hereinafter be cited as Morris; the collection of essays will hereinafter be
cited as LAw AND AuTHomy IN COLONIAL AMERICA]. For a survey of the major works
on colonial legal history see Johnson, American Colonial Legal History: A Historiographical Interpretation, in PERSPEcTIvEs ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 250 (A.
Vaughn & G. Billias eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
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yers arrived in the colonies during the eighteenth century, colonial law
assimilated larger and more technical portions of the common law. By
the time of the Revolution, the colonists had established as their fundamental law the common law, in combination with other types of law, and
modified it to make it suitable to American conditions. Finally, after the
Revolution, the states ratified this development by constitutional or
statutory declarations of the continued authority of the common law as
state law.22
But what types of law replaced the common law during the early
periods of American settlement and to what extent did they exist even
after later adoption of the common law? How did the colonists modify
the common law? Did they receive the common law in a uniform
manner, or was there diversity from one colony to another? Were there
thirteen different legal systems in 1776, or was the common law a basis
for legal uniformity? These are some of the questions that have created
the divergent theories of colonial law among legal historians.
It will suffice for our purpose to follow Zechariah Chafee's suggestion that there are three major theories of the American adoption of the
common law--one proposed by Joseph Story, a second by Paul Reinsch,
and a third by Julius Goebel."
A.

Story's Theory

According to Justice Story, the colonial settlers took the common law
with them to America.
The universal principle (and practice has conformed to it) has been,
that the common law is our birthright and inheritance, and that our ancestors brought hither with them upon their emigration all of it which
was applicable to their situation. The whole structure of our present
24
jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common law.
Story challenges Blackstone's view of the American colonies as con22. Morris, supra note 21, at vii-xi; Chafee, supra note 21, at 55-60.
23. Chafee, supra note 21, at 61-69. See also Chafee, Book Review, 57 HAnv. L. REv.
EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note
9, at 489 [hereinafter cited as Chafee, Book Review].
24. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 157 at
See J. STORY, Codification of the
109-10 (1891) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698-700 (W. Story
ed. 1852) [hereinafter cited as MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS].
For a study of Story's views on the common law in America see J. MCCLELLAN,
JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTTrUTION 160-93 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
MCCLELLAN].

407 (1944), reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
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quered lands and hence not entitled to the laws of Englishmen. 25 He
appeals to the original colonial charters-to their declarations that the
colonists were to be considered natural-born subjects and to their stipulations that colonial laws were to be consonant with those of Englandas "an irrevocable annexation of the colonies to the mother country, as
dependencies governed by the same laws, and entitled to the same
rights." 20 Furthermore, he contends, even if the colonies were regarded
as lands taken from the Indians, the rule as to conquests would not
themselves, who occupied the lands after
apply to the English settlers
27
them.
vacated
the Indians
The defect that legal historians commonly attribute to Story's theory
is that it is too simplistic to explain the complex facts of colonial law.
However, Story regards the common law not as a rigid body of laws but
as a "system of principles, which expands with the exigencies of society."' 28 Story believes that the American common law is not a fixed
substantive or positive law, rather it is a system of flexible principles of
justice that require discretion in their application. It consists "of elementary principles and of juridical truths, which are continually expanding with the progress of society," and among these are "certain fundamental maxims.

. .

which are never departed from" and "others again,

which though true in a general sense, are at the same time susceptible of
modification and exceptions, to prevent them from doing manifest
wrong and injury."29 These necessary modifications of the common
law emerge best from "the gradual application of its principles in courts
of justice to new cases, assisted from time to time, as the occasion may
demand, by the enactments of the legislature." 8
A good example of Story's flexibility in judging the applicability of
the common law to American circumstances is his opinion in Van Ness
v. Pacard.31 Pacard had erected buildings on property rented to him by
Van Ness. When Pacard removed the buildings from the property,
Van Ness brought an action against him for waste committed by him
while a tenant. Although the common law clearly favored the plaintiff,
Story ruled that unless this part of the common law were adopted by a
particular statute or judicial decision, it could be presumed to have been
25. 1 W. B.ACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES

*106-08 (1803) [hereinafter cited as BLACK-

sroNE].

26. STORY, supra note 24, § 156, at 109.
27. Id. §§ 152, 156, 157.
28. MISCELLANEOUS WrTINGS, supra note 24, at 702-05. See also id. at 379.
29. Id. at 702.
30. Id. at 713.

31. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
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inapplicable to colonial conditions. It was inapplicable, he reasoned,
because it would have discouraged tenants from erecting buildings for
agricultural purposes, which would have contradicted the "universal
policy" to encourage the "cultivation and improvement" of the colonial
wilderness. 2
Story acknowledges that this principle of "applicability" created great
legal diversity among the colonies, for there was no central authority for
determining what portions of the common law were applicable to the
colonies. This was left to the various colonial courts to decide according to "local usages and principles":
Of course, from a difference of interpretation, the common law, as actually administered, was not in any two of the colonies exactly the same.
The general foundation of the local jurisprudence was confessedly composed of the same materials; but in the actual superstructure they were
variously combined and modified, so as to present neither a general sym33
metry of design nor a unity of execution.
The distinction between legal uniformity in the "general foundation"
and legal diversity in the "actual superstructure" is crucial for Story's
theory. Only insofar as the common law is in some manner uniform
across the nation can there be a national common law. But in what
form was the common law adopted at the national level?
In United States v. Coolidge,3 4 Story argued that even if the common
law is not a source of substantive powers at the federal level, it is still
necessary for the interpretationof federal powers. To fully exercise the
jurisdiction given them by the Constitution and by acts of Congress, the
courts of the United States must rely on the common law for legal
definitions, rules of procedure and decision, and punishments for offenses, where the positive law has not provided for them.3 5
32. Id. at 144-45.
33. STORY, supra note 24, § 163, at 116. See McCLELLAN, supra note 24, at 325, 33341; MSCELLANEOUS WRrINGS, supra note 24, at 700-01; STORY, supra at 398-400, 40406.
34. 25 F. Cas. 619 (No. 14,857) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
35. Id. at 619-20; STORY, supra note 24, § 158, at 107 n.2. For similar arguments see 1
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 318-19 (1826); J. SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY
o0 LAND) TrrLEs IN MASSACHUSETrS 17-18 (1801) [hereinafter cited as SULLrvAN]; 2 J.
WSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 811 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as WmsoN]. See note 225 infra.
St. George Tucker thought that the English common law could provide rules of
procedure for certain types of cases in federal courts without being a basis of jurisdiction:
[ilts maxims and rules of proceeding are to be adhered to, whenever the written
law is silent, in cases of similar or analogous nature, the cognizance whereof is by
the constitution vested in the federal courts; it may govern and direct the course
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A full account of Story's theory of the common law and its place in
American law would have to take into consideration the close relationship, in his view, of the common law to natural law. Indeed, it could be
suggested that he conceived the reception of the common law in America as the general law of the country to rest not so much on its formal
adoption and application by American legal bodies-since he conceded
that "the common law, as actually administered, was not in any two of
the colonies exactly the same"-but rather on its embodiment of traditional principles of justice in such a way that it would be generally
accepted without question by men with an English heritage, and perhaps
36
by all rational men.
Story's conception of the common law as a system of rational principles that reflects natural law, has made him unpopular with legal
positivists and with legal historians who are concerned with the law only
as it exists in written records. Even Crosskey, whose theory of the
adoption of the common law greatly resembles Story's, refuses to endorse his appeal to natural law. For instance, after denouncing conceptions of the common law based on "juristic metaphysics,"37 Crosskey
quotes the passage in Swift v. Tyson3 where Story refers to Cicero's
description of a law that is the same everywhere, s9 but Crosskey denies
of proceeding, in such cases, but cannot give jurisdiction in any case, where jurisdiction is not expressly given by the constitution.
Tucker, Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England; and Its Introduction Into, And
Authority Within the United American States, in 1 W. BLAcxsTONE, COMMENTARIES 378,
429-30 (S. Tucker ed. 1803 [hereinafter cited as Tucker].
In the New York case of Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sanf. Ch. 583 (N.Y. 1844), it was decided
that the common law was a national law "to a limited extent" since, as "a necessary
consequence from the laws and jurisprudence of the colonies and of the United States
under the articles of confederation," it was co-extensive with the limited powers given the
national government by the Constitution. Id. at 654-55.
36. Consider, for example, Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842):
The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language
of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be
in great measure not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.
Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nune, sei eademque lex obtinebit.
Id. at 19, quoting H. CICERO, Da REPUBLICA xxii. 33.
As to the significance of the quotation from Cicero see D'ENTREVES, supra note 17,
at 25-26, and for some suggestive observations about the possible foundation of legal
justice in nature see ANASTAPLO, supra note 3, at 641-43.
James Sullivan, in his account of the legal system of Massachusetts, explains that "the
positive laws in existence" and the local customs of the state law have been supplemented
by "the general principles of right and wrong" contained in the English common law.
SULLrvAN, supra note 35, at 13-19. See notes 152 & 174 infra.
37. I CnossnnY, supra note 1, at 857-58.
38. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
39. See text accompanying notes 130-32 infra.
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that Story's decision rests on anything beyond the positive law. 40 Hence,
while Story can explain the reception of the common law as the transmission to America of those general principles of natural justice that had
been part of the English common law, Crosskey has to demonstrate that
the English common law was formally adopted in America as positive
law. Story can argue, therefore, that the diversity in the positive law of
the country did not impede the adoption at the national level of the
general legal principles of the common law, legal principles that lay
behind the written law of the Constitution. Crosskey, however, cannot
make such a move if he is to keep his view of the common law free of
"juristic metaphysics."
Since legal historians regard Story's theory of the American common
law as the "orthodox legal theory," they have felt obligated to take his
position into account in their work on early American law. But the
trend has been to criticize him for proposing an overly simple theory
that clashes with the complex heterogeneity of colonial law as manifested in the legal records. He has been accused of disregarding the
conditions of colonial life that precluded a uniform reception of the
common law. One of the first to state these criticisms was Paul
Reinsch, and although his theory of colonial law is now widely considered to be defective, his "revisionist" thesis initiated a controversy about
the nature of early American law that continues even today.
B.

Reinsch's Theory

Reinsch41 disputed Story's claim that the colonists had brought the
English common law with them to America.4" Applying Frederick
Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis" 43 to the history of early colonial law,
he inferred that men as lacking in legal expertise as the first settlers and
living in a wilderness far from England could not have lived under the
common law. Thus the colonists had to establish their own indigenous
legal systems, he maintained, based on Biblical law and popular customs
40. CiossnnY, supra note 1, at 857-58. See text accompanying notes 131-32 infra.
Although he quotes Story's remark [in Swift v. Tyson] on natural law, Crosskey
takes the position that Story decided the issue strictly on legal grounds, and not on
"the nature of law.". . . What Crosskey apparently means by this is simply that
Cicero's general principles were in fact part of the "laws of the United States."
McCLELLAN, supra note 24, at 189. See G. DUNNE, JusTIcE JosEPH STORY AND TIE
RiS- OF THE SUPREmE COURT 406-07 (1970).
41. English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 2 BULLETIN OF THE
UNrsvRsrrY OF WISCONSIN 397 (1899) [hereinafter cited as English Common Law].
42. Id. at 398-99.
43. On the "frontier thesis" see STUDIES IN EARLY AMEimCAN LAw, supra note 21, at
12; Johnson, supra note 21, at 251-57.
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refined by local magistrates and judges.44 Reinsch offered evidence
drawn largely from the early history of New England, where he thought
he had found a simple, untechnical "layman law" founded primarily on
Mosaic law. 45 He was less persuasive respecting the other colonies; he
even conceded that some of the colonies instituted the common law at
46
rather early dates.
It should be noted that Reinsch disagreed with Story only as to early
colonial law; he confessed that at some time before the Revolution the
common law was widely received by the colonies.4 ' In the eighteenth
century, the increasing number of lawyers trained in England and the
rising mercantile class created conditions favorable to the common law.
Based on this Reinsch concluded: "We had a period of rude, untechnical
popular law, followed, as lawyers became numerous and the study
of law prominent, by the gradual reception of most of the rules of
the English common law." 48 Yet he insisted that even under the
dominance of the common law, some elements of the old indigenous
forms of law remained.40
It is surprising to notice the extent to which Story's view accords with
Reinsch's. Reinsch appeared to diverge from Story only because he
falsely assumed that Story had not taken account of indigenous colonial
law as a substitute for and an obstacle to the adoption of the common
law. Reinsch and Story both agree that there was great legal diversity
in the colonies resulting from the existence of various types of local law,
especially during the early history, but despite this, the common law was
in some way generally adopted into the colonies before the Revolution.
Reinsch failed to recognize his essential agreement with Story because
he assumed that Story had naively overlooked the complex variety of
early colonial law, an assumption also held by some later legal historians
who have continued to cite evidence of the variation in colonial law to
refute Story's presumed theory that the common law was present in the
colonies uniformly from the first settlements."0
44. English Common Law, supra note 41, at 399.
45. Id. at 403-08,417.
46. See id.at 420, 432-35, 441-42. An especially striking case of the early reception
of the common law in New York. See id. at 422; Johnson, The Advent of Common Law
in Colonial New York, in LAw AND AuTHoRrry IN COLONIAL AMEIUcA, supra note 21, at
74-87.
47. English Common Law, supra note 41, at 400-01, 415.
48. Id. at 400.
49. Id. at 445-51.
50. See, e.g., G. HAsKiNs, LAw AND AuTHoRriY IN EARLY MASSACHUSE-rs 4-8 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as EARLY MAssAc musETTS]; Morris, supra note 21, at vii-ix.
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We should not, however, obscure the central problem in Story's
theory. For if he concedes that the common law was combined with
various forms of indigenous law, thus creating substantial variation in
the colonial legal systems, how can he still affirm the existence of a
single national common law? The belief that there is a national common law presupposes that whatever variety there might have been at the
colonial or state level, there was nevertheless some form of the English
common law that had been adopted as the law of America as a whole.
Crosskey confronts the same difficulty: he recognizes that it was impossible for the colonies to follow the common law fully and uniformly in their actual legal practice, and yet he insists that the common law
was in some manner the general law of the entire country.
C.

Goebel's Theory

Julius Goebel set forth a theory of colonial law51 similar in some ways
to Reinsch's; he too dissented from Story's position by contending
that the first settlers lacked the legal training necessary for establishing
the common law. Yet Goebel thought that colonial law was too sophisticated to be characterized as crude indigenous law. The colonists did
bring some English law with them, he concluded, but it was the law they
would be expected to know best-local law:52 "the workings of the
county, manorial, or borough tribunals were the length and breadth of
their knowledge of the administration of justice, the local customs the
sum of their law." 53 Therefore, according to this theory, the deviations
of colonial jurisprudence from the common law need not be explained
as a response to frontier life, for even in England the settlers had been
accustomed to local law administered by diverse local courts that followed only roughly the common law of the King's central courts.5 4
But Goebel, like Reinsch, conceded that his thesis concerned only the
early part of colonial history, which was the period "before the Leviathan common law had been set in motion."5 5 In his most recent work,
Goebel has described the dominance of English local law as "the first
phase of American legal development," and the "second phase," which
51. Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century England, 31
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AsmmmcAN
LAW, supra note 9, at 83 [hereinafter cited as King's Law].
52. Id. at 87-88.
53. Id. at 88.
54. See GOEBEL, supra note 20, at 4-6.
55. King's Law, supra note 51, at 119-20.

COLUM. L. RBv. 416 (1931), reprinted in EssAYs
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occurred as English lawyers began arriving in the colonies, was the
ascendancy of the common law over the local law previously imported. 0
It is clear, therefore, that Goebel's thesis as to the presence of English
local law in the colonies is only a partial explanation of colonial legal
history, even if he originally hoped that it would become a general
theory. That is, it draws attention to one type of law that was
important for some of the colonies at early periods of their history. But
Story and Reinsch might also be said to have offered only incomplete
accounts of colonial law. Indeed some legal historians have recently
maintained that early American law was so various and mutable that
any generalization is likely to be only partially correct. This has
resulted in attempts to synthesize the major theories so as to attain a
better grasp of the complex historical phenomena; a prime example is
Zechariah Chafee's "synthetic rubber hypothesis."
D. Chafee's "synthetic rubberhypothesis"
Chafee 57 finds the three different interpretations proposed by Story,
Reinsch, and Goebel each to be true in some respect and yet deficient as
comprehensive explanations of colonial legal development. He then
suggests that a combination of the three into a "synthetic rubber hypothesis' 'r s might allow a grasp of colonial law in all its multifariousness.
Chafee disputes Story's theory to the extent that it implies that the
first settlers transported to the colonies the common law as an accumulation of case law. The want of legal training and the need for simple
modes of litigation made close adherence to English decisions impossible. But Chafee endorses Story's theory insofar as it considers the
56. See GOEBEL, supranote 20, at 5 n.9, 6. Goebel says that because colonial judicial
systems were organized into inferior and superior courts without the property concepts of
jurisdiction prevalent in England, "[t]he conditions for ultimate reception of common
law from the ground up were thus highly favorable." Id. at 16-17. Also, Goebel
believes "that the late eighteenth-century concept of the common law as a body of
principles served to efface the blemish of alien origin and so encourage uninhibited use
of English precedents by the legal profession in the federal courts." I J. GOEnEL, Tun
LAW PRAcTIc OF ALExAiDER HAMILTON 33 (1964).
Furthermore, in the early cases
brought before the Supreme Court, "it was impossible to conduct any disputation on any
proposition of law in a nation of lawyers trained in the common law, no matter how
vagarious the version prevailing in any state, without recourse to sources in general use."
Thus, "the members of the bar are revealed a jurispirili not so much in the law of their
several jurisdictions as in the law on which the law of the states was bottomed." Id. at
34. See also Horwitz, supra note 20, at 1080-82.
57. Chafee, supra note 21, at 71-72.
58. Id. at 80.
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common law as a system of principles easily learned from reading works
such as Coke's Institutes and Dalton's Justice of the Peace.59
As to Reinsch's thesis, Chafee thinks that so far as certain colonial
court records evince important deviations from English law, the evidence favors Reinsch. However, insofar as these records manifest legal
"formality and sophistication, ' 60 the evidence controverts Reinsch's position. Chafee suggests that colonial laymen were knowledgeable about
English law and procedure despite their lack of formal legal training.6 1
He also presumes that over the long period of history before the Revolution, there must have been different degrees of proficiency in English
law in the various colonies at different times.6 2 But his main argument
against Reinsch is that he assumes a substitution of English law before
the Revolution for the indigenous forms of law that had been established
since the original settlements. Surely such a radical legal transformation would have been the subject of vigorous public discussion, but there
is no evidence of this.
Chafee observed that "it seems fair to ask
supporters of the Reinsch theory to produce some contemporaneous
evidence of an awareness on the part of colonists that they had shifted
from a native American law to the recently imported common law.""8
Chafee acknowledges that the colonists apparently gave more attention around the time of the Revolution to English court decisions than
they had previously, but he views this as a reception of English case-law
rather than a reception of the common law (understanding "the common law of England" to mean "the system of principles and rules of
action which obtained in England"). 64 Chafee thinks the colonists
adopted the principles of the common law before they began to appeal
to English cases.65
Chafee objects to Goebel stating that
it is not enough to show that the colonists handled small disputes in the
same way that Englishmen handled small disputes. The real question
is what was done in America about big litigations and serious crimes,
which in England went to the King's courts and were governed by the
common law.6 6
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73-74.
See id. at 74-75.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 78.
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Chafee also doubts that the colonists could have taken English local law
to America without the superior law of the central courts, especially
considering the influence in the colonies of English legal treatises that
cited common law decisions. He also criticizes Goebel for sharing with
Reinsch the questionable assumption that the early colonial legal system
ciashed radically with the common law system subsequently intro67
duced.
Finally, Chafee surmises that these three theories, although defective,
could be improved by being combined. The original colonists might
have brought the common law with them in the form of general principles but without the English case-law that would have required law
libraries and skilled lawyers. The colonists may have supplemented these
common law principles with their own indigenous customary law and
with English local law. Then, in the eighteenth century, as colonial
lawyers became better trained in English law and law libraries improved, English case-law could have gradually displaced the indigenous
law and English local law. Hence Chafee concludes:
[T]here was no "reception" of the common law in the colonies. It was
there from the start in some form, yet not the same form. I think of
it as an outline map which was gradually filled in as the growth of law
brought more and more case-law and
libraries and serious legal students
6
detailed doctrines from England. 8
Chafee's preference for a syncretism of theories is shared by some of
the leading contemporary legal historians. 9 Underlying this tendency
is the conviction that simple generalizations cannot do justice to the
complexity of colonial law. With respect to the adoption of the common law, as George Haskins has remarked, "statements which are true
for one colony are very often untrue for another. '70 The variations in
the position of the common law in colonial America arose from the
types of law, including
combination of the common law with other
71
customs.
indigenous
and
law
English local
67. Id.
68. Id. at 79. See Chafee, Book Review, supra note 23, at 413.
69. See notes 70-71 infra.
70. Haskins, Reception of the Common Law in Seventeenth Century Massachusetts:
A Case Study, in LAW AND AUraorY IN COLONIAL AMEmICA, supra note 21, at 17
[hereinafter cited as Haskins]. Long ago Richard Morris declared: "No general rule
can be formulated .... The extent to which the common law was adopted in the
colonies must be actually determined in each specific situation." STUDms IN EAILY
AmERIcAN LAw, supra note 13, at 12. See also EARLY MASSAcru arrs, supra note 50, at
6.
71. See EARLY MASSACIIJSETrS, supra note 50, at xi, 6, 164-79; Haskins, supra note
70, at 18-19, 25-26; Katz, Looking Backward: The Early History of Americain Law, 33
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Some legal historians have confirmed Chafee's suspicion that the
common law was present in the colonies at dates much earlier than was
thought by either Reinsch or Goebel. Furthermore, it has been found
that legal practice in early America was quite sophisticated and even
comparable in some respects to English practice. 72 These conclusions
seem to support Justice Story's thesis. But the leading legal historians
still dispute Story's case respecting the status of the common law as a
law of the nation, a law uniformly applicable to the whole of America.
The separate adoptions of the common law by the colonies, and subsequently by the states, did not, they maintain, establish a single uniform law: thirteen separate legal systems received the common law in
different forms and in varying combinations with other types of law.73
Story did, however, as previously noted recognize the legal diversity in
the colonies and in the states. But nevertheless he argued that the
common law, as a fundamental rule of action, was assumed by the
Constitution to be a national common law.
This question, as to whether the reception of the common law .in
various forms by the colonies and the states could have been the basis
for a national common law, is the fundamental issue not only between
Story and his critics but also between Crosskey and Goebel. Yet insofar
as Story thought that the American colonists initially established the
common law as a system of general legal principles rather than as an
accumulation of case-law, he had some grounds for explaining how the
common law could have been a general national law in spite of the
variety in the colonial legal systems. That is, he could have argued that
although the common law embodied in the English court decisions had
been applied very diversely and with great modifications, certain general
principles of the common law had been received uniformly. But this
differs from the argument employed by Crosskey.
E. .Crosskey'stheory
Crosskey purports to show that "when the pre-Revolutionary controversy broke out, Americans generally regarded the Common Law,
V. Cm. L. REv. 867, 870, 872, 884 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Looking Backward]. As
an example of the complexity of early colonial law, consider the numerous components of
the law in Maryland. Smith, The Foundationsof Law in Maryland: 1634-1715, in LAw
AND AtrruoRrrY iN COLONIAL AMmICA, supranote 21, at 92-93, 107-08.
72. EARLY MAssAcHusETTs, supra note 50, at 180-82; G. WooD, THE CREATIoN OF
THE AMmcAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1789, at 296-98 (1969); Looking Backward, supra note
71, at 870, 872-83; Morris, supra note 21, at vii-iii.
73. See EARLY MASSACHUSETs, supra note 50, at 4-7; Morris, supra note 21, at vii.
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including its British statutory amendments, as the general basic customary law of all the American colonies.174 He also maintains that this
conception of of the common law in the colonies "passed, very easily
and naturally, into a conception of it as a law of the United States as a
whole, in the late 1770's and early 1780's."7r5 But Crosskey's primary
concern is with the importance of this reception of the common law for
the members of the Constitutional Convention:
To the Americans of that time, who met in the Convention, there was
but one system, the system of the Common Law, with its British statutory
amendments, which America had inherited from England. That system
existed in America, subject to some local variants on particular matters,
much as it existed in the mother country. But these local variants did
not alter the general fact that there was, in a very real sense, a single
system of law in America; a system badly organized, subject to much
uncertainty, and in the hands of courts very variously appointed and em70
powered; but still, in spite of all this, a single system.
Thus, Crosskey maintains that the general acceptance of the common
law as the uniform law of the country persisted despite the displacement
of inapplicable portions of this English law by local laws and customs.
Such displacement accorded with the nature of the common law, he
explains, for even in England there were local customs that diverged
77
from the customary law of the entire kingdom.
Thus, Crosskey makes an argument similar to Story's. He contends
that during the few decades before the Constitutional Convention, the
common law was somehow the general, customary law of all America.
This is true, Crosskey contends, in spite of the admitted diversity in the
application of that law first by the colonies and then by the states. Hence
he must argue that
though the applicability of English law was, . . . somewhat variable
among the thirteen American colonies, and local legislation and, to a
certain extent, local customary rules displaced that law, among them,
in a somewhat varying degree, the English law, insofar as it was deemed
to be applicable, was everywhere thought of as law which was general,
78
not local, in character.
Since Crosskey undertakes his historical study of the American adoption of the common law only for the sake of illuminating certain
74. I Cossxuy, supra note 1, at 622.
75. Id. at 623.
76. Id. at 663.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 623.
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portions of the Constitution (particularly article III on the Judiciary) he
is concerned solely with the views of "the Americans of 1787"; he
dismisses as irrelevant Crosskey's opinions prevalent in earlier 'orlater
periods. Therefore, Crosskey investigates the ideas about the common
law that were held by Americans in the 1760's and after the Declaration

of Independence until the ratification of the Constitution. He considers
his primary problem to be the determination of whether the Revolution
affected attitudes towards the common law and, if so, how. 79 By so
restricting the purview of his inquiry, Crosskey leaves himself free to
concede the arguments of Reinsch, Goebel and others as to the nature of

colonial law in the early periods when there were many obstacles to the
common law. Therefore, he seems to intend his thesis of the common

law as the general customary law of America to apply only to the last
years of colonial history, to what Goebel calls "the second phase" of
colonial legal history. 0
Crosskey's first piece of evidence concerning the reception of the
English common law in the 1760's is a remark by James Otis.

Otis is

said to have declared that the common law, its Parliamentary amendments, and the acts of Parliament that named the plantations were

"received and practiced" in the colonies.8 1 A second piece of evidence

sustaining the first is the acceptance by the Congress that passed the
Stamp Act of the colonial jurisdiction of Parliament respecting "general

Acts for the Amendment of the Common Law."8"
Crosskey concludes that Otis and the "Stamp Act Congress" viewed

the common law "as the continuing uniform basic law of the entire
79. Id. at 583-84.
80. Id. at 585-86, 622-23.
81. Id. at 584. Crosskey attributes incorrectly the cited passage to Otis. Actually it
is from a resolution of the General Assembly of Massachusetts Bay that Otis appended
to his essay. See J.OTIs, THE RIGHTs oF E BamsH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PRovED
49, 108-09 (1764) [hereinafter cited as OaTs].
82. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 584. Crosskey quotes brief phrases from two
passages in the resolution of the Stamp Act Congress addressed to the House of
Commons. In the first passage, the Congress proclaims:
It is also humbly submitted whether there be not a material distinction, in reason
and sound policy, at least, between the necessary exercise of parliamentary jurisdiction in general acts, and the common law, and the regulation of trade and commerce
through the whole empire, and the exercise of that jurisdiction by imposing taxes
on the colonies.
JOURNAL OF THE Fmsr CoNGRESS OF ThE AmEICAN COLONiES 40 (1845).
Subsequently, the Congress affirmed "that their tthe colonists'] subordination to the parliament is
universally acknowledged." PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SouRCES AND DOCUMENTS ON
Tm STAMP Acr CRisis 68 (E.Morgan ed. 1959). In quoting from the second passage,
Crosskey refers to "general subordination," but the word "general" is not included in any
of the sources.
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Empire. ' 83 But he immediately adds a cautionary note, warning that
this conclusion
is not meant to imply that the law-and, particularly, the practical law
-of the thirteen colonies, in the 1760's, was, or that it ever had been,
completely conformable 84to English Law, or wholly uniform as between
the colonies themselves.
Although the colonial charters generally required a complete conformity
of colonial law to English law, certain peculiar circumstances in the
colonies-particularly, those connected with religion, slavery, and landownership-prevented English law from being entirely applicable.
Hence "there never had been more than partial and approximate conin practice. '8' Thus Crosskey admits that Otis's
formity to English law
"sweeping statement ' 88 must be qualified by recognition that the colonies accepted only those portions of English law "applicable" to their
87
situation.
Although adaptation to local circumstances was a principle of the
common law itself, confusion resulted in the colonies. Crosskey observes that this confusion resulted because they lacked the efficient
judicial administration necessary for a uniform determination of "applicability." Consequently, the "practical law" of the colonies became
diverse. If the colonial legal system had been more sophisticated, an
American customary law could have been established to cover those
areas where the English common law was inapplicable. However, "the
. . . rules of local 'common,' or customary, law were the rules, at best;

of inferior courts; besides, they resided only in oral tradition and in the
undigested, incomplete, and highly inaccessible handwritten records' of
the colonial courts.188 Evidence of the disordered legal diversity in the
colonies, caused by confusion as to the application of English law,
suggests that Otis and the "Stamp Act Congress" might have dissembled
in the declarations quoted above in order to reassure the English authorities as to the legal subordination of the colonies. Crosskey thinks this
when one considers certain comments made by
seems unlikely, however,
8a
Thomas Pownall.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

I CROSSxEY, supra note 1, at 584.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 584-87.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 586-90.
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Pownall, in The Administration of the British Colonies,9" confirms
the other evidence of the uncertainties in colonial law in its relation to
English law and the absence of a unified and properly constituted
judicial system. But he also reports that many colonial leaders wished
to overcome these defects in colonial jurisprudence and that a large
number proposed the establishment of "a supreme court of appeal and
equity" as the best reform. 91 This proposal, Crosskey asserts,
constitutes further evidence of the truth of the statements made by
James Otis and the Stamp Act Congress, in 1764 and 1765, as to the
then general American receptiveness to English law. For the fact that
the proposal was made is in itself evidence that the uncertainties and
diversities, in colonial law, which then existed, were not regarded by
colonial lawyers, as being-at any rate, in their totality-local "common
law" which it was desirable to conserve. Instead they must have been
92
regarded, at least in very great degree, as evils.
Thus, Crosskey argues that no matter how unfavorable to the common
law the legal practice of the colonies might have been, colonial leaders
were "receptive" to its adoption.
Crosskey's thesis begins now to take on a new appearance, for he
seems to explain the link of American jurisprudence to English law as
more a matter of "receptiveness" than of "reception." 93 This was
implicit even in the general statements quoted previously. Crosskey
stated that the common law was "generally regarded" as American law,
that it was "thought of" as the general law of the colonies, and that this
"conception" of the common law prevailed at the time of the Constitutional Convention. He suggests that the common law was considered in
principle the general, customary law of the colonies, but that colonial
courts failed in practice to accomplish a perfect adoption of this law by
90. See id. 590-93. 1 T. POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
[hereinafter cited as POWNALL].

91.
92.

POWNALL,

COLONIES

(1764)

supra note 90, at 129-36.
1, at 593.

-I CRossanY, supra note

93. For examples of Crosskey's use of the word "receptiveness" see id. at 586, 592-93.
Claiming that the growing "receptiveness" to English law before the Revolution has
been seen by "careful students of the period," Crosskey cites Paul Reinsch's monograph,

English Common Law, supra note 27, and Charles Andrews' book. C. ANDRnws, THE
COLONIAL BAcKGROUND OF THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION (1931) [hereinafter cited as
ANDREWS]; see I CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 586; II id. at 1341 n.21. Andrews states
that the colonists "as a rule, were too much occupied in making a living. . . . to doubt
the legality of a system [i.e., the English legal supervision over the colonies) that offered
so many opportunities for evasion." The obvious question is whether the colonists' "opportunities for evasion" of English law vitiated their affirmation of its "legality." See

ANDREwS, supra, at 46, 49, 56-57, 59-60.
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applying it uniformly to all of the colonies. This failure was caused by
(1) the inapplicability of some parts of the English common law to
colonial conditions; (2) the lack of clear rules for determining its
applicability; (3) the absence of the general judicial organization necessary for insuring uniformity in the laws; and (4) the nonexistence of
proper equity courts.
Occasionally, however, Crosskey speaks of an actual reception in
practice of the common law as the general law of America. For
instance, he contends that even after the displacements of the common
law by "peculiar local customs in particular colonies, . . . there re-

mained a vast body of customary law in use in the American states that
was common to England and all America. ' '94 He argues that the
customary law of the American states in 1787 was the common law
shared by all, rather than the local customary law peculiar to each,
because the records of the English common law were easily available
whereas there were almost no written records of state customary law.
The fact simply is that these English lawbooks were the only evidence
of American customary law that Americans had; and if, in these circumstances, Americans were prone to regard their customary law as "a
single, transcendent corpus," a body of law which the colonies, or states,
all had in common, and which the nation as a whole had in common
with England, it was, it would seem, only the perception of an obvious
fact.9 5
But still he concedes that without a national judicial system there was no
way for the adoption of the common law by the colonies, and then by
the states, to be carried out in a uniform manner. Hence, until the
ratification of the Constitution, the status of the common law as the
uniform general law of America had to rest more on the "receptiveness"
of American leaders than on the actual practice of American law."0
To sustain his view that the common law was accepted as the general
customary law of America in 1787, Crosskey must thus show that
American attitudes favoring the common law as a uniform law were
strong enough to compensate for the diversities and uncertainties in its
practical application. This point should be kept in mind, for Goebel
bases much of his attack on evidence of the legal practice of the colonies
or the states, evidence of which Crosskey was fully cognizant but which
he did not regard as decisive for determining the place of the common
law in the America of 1787.
94. I CRossKEY, supranote 1, at 607 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 608-09.
96. Id. at 607, 609.
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By maintaining that Americans were "receptive" to the common law
as the general law of the whole country, even when the legal practice of
the times did not allow the fulfillment of this goal, Crosskey can argue
that the national common law existed in potentiality until the Constitution provided the means for establishing the national judicial system
necessary for actualizing this national common law. But is this not a
type of "juristic metaphysics" since it assumes that law can have an
existence beyond the written law and legal practice of a people? Perhaps for this reason, Crosskey would prefer to argue that the national
common law was a part of the actual legal practice of America even
before the ratification of the Constitution. The local variations from
this national common law are then explained as comparable to the
situation in England, where it is a principle of the common law that
from the
varying local circumstances require some local departures
97
courts.
central
King's
the
of
law
kingdom-wide common
F.

Crosskey, Story, and the legal historians

This short survey of the major theories of early American legal history
shows a general agreement that there were two phases of this history.
During the first period the original settlers established various types of
law, including indigenous law (Reinsch) and English local law (Goebel). Although some research has shown the common law to be
present even in the earliest periods, its full adoption did not come until
the eighteenth century, which was the second phase of colonial legal
development. Due to the arrival of English lawyers, the expansion of
colonial law libraries, and the needs of the rising mercantile class, the
common law was widely received into eighteenth-century America.
But although recognizing this general reception of the common law,
many historians of colonial law tend to emphasize the persistent diversity of the law that resulted from the combination of the English common
law with different types of preexisting law. The common law dominated but could not abolish the earlier law. Furthermore, there was
variation in the common law itself since its applicability to colonial
circumstances was variously interpreted in the different legal systems. It
was also argued, as previously noted, that this legal diversity continued
even after the formal reception of the common law by the states after the
Revolution; for the states continued to maintain thirteen different systems of the common law. Hence some legal historians are inclined to
believe that American law was too pluralistic for there to have been an
97. See text accompanying notes 99, 131-32, 154-55, 174-77, 223-24 infra.
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adoption of the common law as a single national law. Therefore, they
dismiss Joseph Story's theory of the reception of the common law as too
simplistic.
It has also been noted that Story and Crosskey agree as to the thesis
that despite the great diversity in early American law, the common law
was received into America as the general, customary law of the whole
country. Just as Story admits that "the common law, as actually
administered, was not in any two of the colonies exactly the same,"8 so
Crosskey concedes that the common law was diversely applied in the
colonies and that "complete conformity to English law was not a practical possibility." Yet they both maintain that the common law was
somehow the uniform law of all America. Hence, they share the problem of showing how the common law could have arisen out of such legal
variation to become a single system of national law. But whereas Story
explains that the common law was adopted at the national level not as
substantive law but as general principles of legal justice, Crosskey would
like to prove that the national common law was part of the substantive
written law of the nation. He must, however, at times admit that the
national status of this common law rested largely on the "receptiveness"
of American leaders rather than on an actual "reception" into American
9
law.

I.
A.

GOEBEL'S CRITIQUE OF CROSSKEY

Lord Mansfield and "generaljurisprudence"

Goebel, after some opening remarks in which he rebukes Crosskey
for disregarding some important secondary works, 00 devotes the first
98. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
99. McClellan remarks that "contemporary critics Chafee, Reinsch, and Goebel fail to
consider in their unsympathetic treatment of the 'orthodox' theory . . . its underlying
philosophical assumption," which is the connection of the common law to natural law.
"According to.

.

. Story," McClellan says,

the problem of adoption could not be construed in strictly legal terms, and thus the
answer did not lie solely in colonial records. . . . Case law digested and compounded into scientific commentaries, was after all, only a microcosm of the macrocosm, reflecting a general "omnipresence" of "natural" rights attained over centuries.

McCLELLAN, supra note 24, at 193.
100. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 451-52. Goebel criticizes Crosskey for not citing
Goebel's Law Enforcement in Colonial New York (J. GOEBEL, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN
CoLr.oNL NEW YoRK (1944)) or Joseph Smith's Appeals to the Privy Council from the
American Plantations (J. SMrrH, APPEUrS TO THE PRVY COUNCIL FROM m AMERICAN
PLANTATIONS (1950)) [hereinafter cited as APPEALS TO m PRIVY COUNCIL]. Professor
Malcolm Sharp has replied to Goebel by asserting that Smith's book is "favorable to Mr.
Crosskey's position" and by observing: "Mr. Goebel's complaint that Mr. Crosskey did
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part of his review to a refutation of Chapter 18 of the book ("Eighteenth-Century 'General Jurisprudence' and 'the Common Law' "),
which he regards as "the philosophical scaffold" of Crosskey's theory of
the common law in America. In this chapter, Crosskey first summariz-

es certain eighteenth-century theories of English law in its relationship
to other types of law. He then attempts to indicate how these theories

were transmitted to American lawyers through the doctrines of "general
jurisprudence" expounded by Lord Mansfield, who served as Chief

Justice of the King's Bench in the second half of the eighteenth century.
According to Crosskey, the great achievement of Mansfield was the

incorporation into the English common law of that part of "the law of
nations" pertaining to commerce.' "The general law of commerce"
necessarily applied between citizens of different nations, but Mansfield
also applied it between Englishmen where it was convenient. Therefore, in accordance with the ordering of national and international

bodies of law known as "general jurisprudence," the common law was
primarily "a body of kingdom-wide English judicial customs." However,

"a considerable number of these kingdom-wide customs were customs

that England was believed to share with the entire civilized world.'

02

Crosskey contends that Mansfield's view of the common law's incor-

poration of international commercial law was widely influential in
America. He cites laudatory references to Mansfield made by James
Wilson, Nathaniel Chipman, Zephaniah Swift, Thomas McKean, and
John Marshall. 0 3 He refers to two Pennsylvania cases that evince
Mansfield's influence-Steinmetz v. Currie'0 4 and Hunter v. Blodget. 0 5
not use one of Mr. Goebel's books is a simple clue to Mr. Goebel's misunderstanding of
Mr. Crosskey's thesis." Letter from Malcolm Sharp to the Journal of Legal Education,
October 9, 1963. Presumably, the latter remark was intended to suggest that since
Crosskey denies many of the accepted theories of colonial law, he should not be expected
to use Goebel's book. For a similar reply to Goebel on the point see Petro, supra note 9.
Had Crosskey been satisfied with the work of these historians, his own would not
have been forthcoming ....
But it is not true, as the reviewer seems generally
to suggest, that Crosskey has dispensed with secondary scholarship to any unusual
extent .... Any examination of the book will turn up an abundance of citations
to secondary authority ....

Id. at 314.
Crosskey's defenders can take pleasure in the fact that Goebel himself has been

criticized for ignoring important secondary sources such as B.

BAILYN, IDEOLOICmAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERiCAN REVOLUTION (1967), and G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE
A mucAN REPUBLIC (1969). See Horwitz, supra note 20, at 1077.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

I CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 33-34, 36, 569-71, 576, 579.
Id. at 564-65.
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 270 (1788).
2 Yeates 480 (Pa. 1799).
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In the first case, Justice McKean stated that since the case concerned a
bill of exchange between a citizen of Pennsylvania and a citizen of New
York, it should be decided according to "the general mercantile law of
nations.' ' 6 Furthermore, the court ruled that a decision made by
Mansfield in 1786 concerning this commercial law was applicable in
Pennsylvania.""7 Hunter v. Blodget also involved a bill of exchange,
and the court decided that an English decision of 1789 should be
followed.' 05
Crosskey desires to prove that the prevailing view in America at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, and for a few decades afterwards, was that commercial matters between citizens of different states
and, to a large extent, between citizens of the same state should be
regulated by "the general commercial law," which was one of the
portions of the English common law applicable to America. Only later,
he contends, did the Jeffersonians begin to substitute the conflict-of-laws
technique for this national commercial law. 09
Goebel offers a number of criticisms. He accuses Crosskey of using
the term "general jurisprudence" anachonistically since it did not come
into use before the nineteenth century." 0 He also states that Crosskey
presents no evidence of Mansfield's influence in America before 1790
and thereby fails to show his influence over the the Constitutional
Convention.-" He also charges Crosskey with misinterpreting Mansfield's own views by attributing to him a strong interest in natural law.
106. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 270.
107. Id. See I CRossKEY,supra note 1, at 572.
108. 2 Yeates at 481. See I CROSSKEY, supra note 1,at 572-73, 648.
109. The early American conception of commercial law described by Crosskey was
well stated by James Sullivan. Sullivan maintained that since commerce was properly
governed by the law of nations rather than by strictly local law, and since the
Constitution empowered the national government to enforce this international commercial law in America, the Congress should enact a uniform commercial law that would be
upheld by the national judiciary against the states. He thought this necessary to prevent
unnecessary diversity in commercial law resulting from a conflict-of-laws procedure.
SuLLIVAN, supra note 35, at 337-38, 252-56. See Vanuxem v. Hazlehurst, 4 N.J. 223,
229-31 (1818); I CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 573-74; Z. Swin, A DiGEsr OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND

PRoMIssoRY NoTEs 210, 283-86 (1810). Cf. note 36 supra and note 174 infra.
110. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 452-53. Goebel also challenges Crosskey's
employment of Montesquieu's term "orders of law" by arguing that this phrase was not
conceived before Montesquieu introduced it in the middle of the eighteenth century. But
this objection seems rather trivial. Crosskey's citation of Montesquieu is intended as an
example of the eighteenth century conception of a hierarchy of laws; and for this
purpose, the peculiar terminology that Montesquieu uses to express this traditional idea is
irrelevant. See Petro, supra note 9, at 319-20.
111. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 454-55.
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Indeed he notes that the quotation from one of Mansfield's cases that
Crosskey employs to demonstrate Mansfield's reliance on natural law is

not taken from Mansfield's remarks, as Crosskey indicates, but from the
opinion of Wilmot, one of the puisne judges.' 1 2
Goebel fails to mention that two examples of the eighteenth-century

use of "general jurisprudence" appear in Crosskey's text-one from
James Wilson and another from Richard Wooddeson. 1"

3

The passages

from these two men are alike in their uses of other expressions as well;
in fact, the likeness is so great that it is clear that Wilson must have

copied Wooddeson's passage with only a few changes but without ac-"
knowledging his debt to Wooddeson.'1 4
The passages cited by Crosskey from the writings of Wilson are
strong pieces of evidence for showing the influence in America of

Mansfield's conception of commercial law.

But Crosskey's reliance on

Wilson, whose quoted remarks were made after the signing of the"
Constitution, only emphasizes his failure to produce evidence involving
112. Id. at 457.
113. I & II CnossEY, supra note 1, at 571, 1260 nA. Petro and Sharp refer to
Wilson but overlook Wooddeson's use of the term. Petro, supra note 9, at 319. Letter
from Malcolm Sharp to Journalof Legal Education, October 18, 1963.
114. Since they are pertinent to some of Goebel's other criticisms, Wilson's remarks
(from his LECTuRts ON LAW, delivered in 1790-91) merit quotation at length:
The law of nations, in its full extent, is a part of the law of Englandk ...
One branch of that law [the law of merchants]. . . . has been admitted to decide
controversies concerning bills of exchange, policies of insurance, and other mercantile transactions, both where citizens of different 1states, and where citizens of the
same state only, have been interested in the event. This system has, of late years,
been greatly elucidated, and reduced to rational and solid principles, by a series of
adjudications, for which the commercial world is much indebted to a celebrated
judge, long famed for his comprehensive talents and luminous learning in general
jurisprudence.
is the law maritime. In a cause deAnother branch of the law of nations, ....
pending in the court of king's bench in England, and tried at one of the assizes,
my Lord Mansfield, the great judge to whom allusion has been just now made, was
desirous to have a case made of it for solemn adjudication; not because he himself
entertained great doubts concerning it; but in order to settle the point, on which
it turned, more deliberately, solemnly, and notoriously; as it was of an extensive
nature; and especially as the maritime law is not the law of a particular country,
but the general law of nations: non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc,
alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omni tempore, una. eademque lex
obtinebit.m
1 & 2 WaLsoN, supra note 35, at 278-79. See also id. at 281-82. In the quoted passage,
footnote "k" contains only a citation----"3 Burr. 1481," which refers to Mansfield's
decision in Triequet v. Bath (1764). Footnote 'T' contains the following statement by
Wilson: "In commercial cases, all nations ought to have their laws conformable to each
other. Fides servanda est; simplicitas juris gentium praevalet. 3 Burr. 1672." This is a
quotation from Wilmot's decision in Pillans v. Van Mierop (1765). In footnote "in," he
gives the source of his Latin quotation that originated with Cicero---"2 Burr. 887,". a
reference to Mansfield's decision in Luke v. Lyde (1759).
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any of the other members of the Constitutional Convention." 86 Fur-

thermore, except for his reference to Steinmetz v. Currie,11 6 decided in
1788, the rest of his evidence seems entirely drawn from sources dated
after 1795.117
Hence, Crosskey's historical evidence for the reception of Mansfield's
doctrines by the Framers of the Constitution is, as Goebel claims,

insufficient."" Nevertheless, Goebel seems to denigrate unfairly Crosskey's inference that Mansfield must have influenced the legal thinking
of the American lawyers of his time simply by virtue of his judicial
position. Goebel denies, for example, the assumption that Mansfield's
decisions were widely studied since, as Crosskey says, "the most readily
available of the English law reports were those most recent.""x 9 Goebel
maintains that Burrow's reports of Mansfield's cases, of which the first
volume appeared in 1768 and the set of four volumes in 1772, were
not easily accessible to Americans. He notes, for instance, that Burrow

was cited in Maryland 20 and Massachusetts' 2 ' in 1768 and in Pennsylvania in 1776.122 He thus gives the impression that Burrow's reports
were only rarely cited; but if one peruses the three American law reports
115. However, Crosskey does contend that
the various lawyer-members of the Federal Convention... had grown up professionally whilst Mansfield was holding the highest office known to the Common
Law; and a number of the more important delegates had received their legal education in England, at the Inns of Court, during Mansfield's period in office.
1 CnossnnY, supra note 1, at 563. Goebel says that the Inns of Court in the eighteenth
century were "merely a mechanism for admission to the bar." Ex Parte Clio, supra note
6, at 454. But this does not refute Crosskey's claim that those who went to England
would have been exposed to Mansfield's views. See Petro, supra note 9, at 321. On the
importance of the Inns of Court for training colonial lawyers see EARLY MASSACHUSxrrrs,
supra note 50, at 6; STimus INEARLY A2mmIcAN LAW, supra note 21, at 65-66.

116. 1 U.s. (1Dall.) 269 (1788).
117. Yet it is not true that Crosskey gives no evidence at all of Mansfield's pre-1790
influence in America. In a footnote to chapter 18, he refers to a note earlier in the book
in which he draws attention to a remark by Mansfield-replying to a letter written by
James Duane, then mayor of New York, who sought clarification of a legal point
involving the law of nations-which was quoted in various colonial newspapers in 1785.
I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 463, 565; II id. at 1339 n.8.
118. With respect to some of the points under discussion, Crosskey supplements the
admittedly sparse historical evidence with evidence based on his textual analysis of
certain provisions of the Constitution and of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is largely
neglected by Goebel, and which is beyond the scope of this paper. See note 18 supra.
119. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 609; Ex parte Clio, supra note 6, at 454-55.
120. Holt's Lessee v. Smith, 1 Md. 275 (1768). Goebel incorrectly identifies the case
as Mayson's Lessee v. Sexton, 1 Harr. & McH. 275 (Md. 1768), which is the immediately following case. Also, Goebel overlooks the earlier citation of Burrow's reports in
Drane v. Hodges, 1 Harr. & McH. 262, 271 (Md. 1771).
121. Apthorp v. Shepard, Quin. 298 (Mass. 1768).
122. Wheeler v. Hughes, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 23, 24 (Pa. 1776).
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to which he refers, one will find numerous references to the first three

volumes of Burrows reports, and even the fourth volume is cited in
Pennsylvania as early as 1784.123
The passage from Wilson's writing cited above is also pertinent to

another point raised by Goebel. He accuses Crosskey of an excessive
concern with abstract speculation about natural law and of incorrectly
attributing this "moonstruck nonsense" to Mansfield and those he influenced. Goebel considers Mansfield "a reformer of the common law,
imaginative, daring and hardheaded'; but he insists that, contrary to
123. Hawkins v. Hanson, 1 Harr. & McH. 523, 525, 527 (Md. 1787); Chews Lessee v.
Weems, 1 Harr. & McH. 463, 476, 478-79, 483, 486, 489, 493, 497, 499-501 (Md. 1775);
Winchester's Lessee v. Tilghman, 1 Harr. & McH. 452, 453, 455-56 (Md. 1775); Miller v.
Lord Proprietary, 1 Harr. &McH. 543, 546-47 (Md. 1774); Smith's Lessee v. Middleton,
1 Harr. & McH. 521 (Md. 1773); each v. Slater, 1 Harr. & McH. 513, 514, 517 (Md.
1773); Thompson v. Towson, 1 Harr. & McH. 504, 507 (Md. 1772); Lane's Lessee v.
Norris, 1 Harr. & McH. 459, 460, 462 (Md. 1772); Lord Proprietary v. Brown, 1 Harr.
& McH. 434, 439, 444-49 (Md. 1772); Chamberlain's Lessee v. Crawford, 1 Harr. &
McH. 355, 361-62 (Md. 1772); Hutchin's Lessee v. Erickson, 1 Harr. & McH. 339, 342
(Md. 1772); Carvill's Lessee v. Griffith, 1 Harr. & McH. 297, 314-15, 319 (Md. 1772);
Belt v. Belt, 1 Harr. & McH. 409, 413, 418 (Md. 1771); Perkins v. Executors of Perkins,
1 Harr. & McH. 400, 402 (Md. 1771); Coursey v. Wright, 1 Harr. & McH. 394, 396, 399
(Md. 1771); Dashiel v. Heron, 1 Harr. & McH. 385, 389, 391 (Md. 1771); Hath's
Lessee v. Polk, 1 Harr. & McH. 363, 366 (Md. 1770); Hammond's Lessee v. Brice, 1
Harr. & McH. 322, 331 (Md. 1769); Johnson v. Howard, 1 iarr. & McH. 281, 285-87,
290-91, 293, 295 (Md. 1768); Mayson's Lessee v. Sexton, 1 Harr. & McH. 275, 278
(Md. 1768); Hooton v. Grout, Quin. 341, 349-51, 353-54 (Mass. 1772); Symes v. Hill,
Quin. 318, 320, 322 (Mass. 1771); Apthorp v.Shepard, Quin. 298, 299 (Mass. 1768).
See Thompson v. Musser, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 458, 462, 465 (Pa. 1789); Lerinz v. Will, 1
U.S. (1 Dal.) 430, 432 (Pa. 1789); D'Utrich v. Melchor, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 428, 429 (Pa.
1789); Thompson v. White, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 424 (Pa. 1789); Respublica v. Teischer, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 335, 338 (Pa. 1788); Mufflin v. Bingham, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 272, 274-75
(Pa. 1788); Steinmetz v. Currey, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 234, 235 (Pa. 1788); Pollard v.
Shaafer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 210, 212, 214 (Pa. 1787); James v. Allen, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
188, 189 (Pa. 1786); Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 175, 176-77 (Pa. 1786);
Grier v. Grier, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 173, 174 (Pa. 1786); Hamilton's Lessee v. Calloway, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 93 (Pa. 1784); Respublica v. Doan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 86, 90 (Pa. 1872);
Morris's Lessee v. Banderen, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 64, 66 (Pa. 1872); Jacobs v. Admas, 1
U.S. (1 Dal.) 52 (Pa. 1781); Respublica v. Powell, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 47 (Pa. 1780);
Wheeler v. Hughes, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 23, 24 (Pa. 1776); M'Clenachan v. M'Carty, 1 U.S.
(1 Dall.) 375, 380-81, 385-86 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1788); Waters v. Millar,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 369, 370 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1788); Murdoch v. Will, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 341, 344 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1788); Wallace v. Fitzsimmons, 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 247, 249 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1788); Eastwick v.
Hugg, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 222 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1787); Purviance v. Angus,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 180, 184 (Ct. Err. & App. Pa. 1786); Burrows v. Heysham, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 133 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Phila. County 1785); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 110, 112 (Oyer & Terminer Phila. 1784); Talbot v. Commander and
Owners, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 95, 102, 106-09 (Ct. Err. & App. Pa. 1784).
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Crosskey, Mansfield handled his reforms as practical matters that did
not require philosophizing about natural law. To illustrate Mansfield's
view of the general commercial law as a part of the law of nations,
Crosskey quotes the following from the case of Pillans v. Van Mierop,
"in commercial cases, all nations ought to have their laws conformable
to each other: fides servanda est, simplicitasjurs gentium praevaleat."124
But Goebel points out that this remark was made by Wilmot rather
than Mansfield and that Mansfield characteristically eschewed the
"grandiloquence" of his colleague.' 25 An examination of the Wilson
quotation not only explains Crosskey's incorrect citation, but also provides support for his interpretation of Mansfield's doctrines.
Wilson refers in his footnotes to three cases in which Mansfield
participated without indicating whether he is referring to Mansfield's
own words. The first citation is Mansfield's decision in Triquet v.
Batn; 2 6 the second the statement from Wilmot's opinion in Pillansv. Van
Mierop127 that Crosskey mistakenly attributes to Mansfield; and the
third, Mansfield's affirmation in Luke v. Lyde, 2 s of the commercial
law as part of the law of nations, which Cicero described as existing
"among all peoples and at all times" (apud omnes gentes et omni
tempore). It is understandable that Crosskey mistakenly took the
middle citation as a reference to Mansfield, especially since it came as a
footnote to Wilson's explicit praise of Mansfield. But it is obvious that
Yeinot's appeal to the law of nations as expressed in the Latin quotation
concerning the "simplicitas uris gentium," is duplicated by Mansfield's
appeal to this same law as described by Cicero. Reliance on natural law
is evident in both.
Mansfield's invocation of the law of nations made an impression not
only upon James Wilson, but also upon Joseph Story. In the important
passage, noted earlier, from Swift v. Tyson, 2 Story explains his own
conception of general commercial law in its application to America by
appealing to the same Ciceronian quotation used by Mansfield.18 0 Thus,
124. 3 Burr. 1663 (K.B. 1765).
125. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 456-59. See I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 570.
126. 3 Burr. 1481 (K.B. 1764).
127. 3 Burr. 1672 (K.B. 1765).
128. 2 Burr. 887 (K.B. 1759).
129. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
130. See note 36 supra. Story once urged a law student:
[Y]ou should ever remember that real, solid, permanent fame belongs to higher attainments, to the knowledge of principles, & to that noble jurisprudence, of which
Lord Mansfield, quoting Cicero, said that nature was not one law at Rome & another at Athens.
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we find a clear line of connection, from Mansfield to Wilson and then to
Story is transmitted to America, in which Mansfield functions as a conduit through which the conception of the common law as encompassing
the law of nations respecting commercial matters (and thus connected
to natural law).
It is odd that Goebel should criticize Crosskey for falsely ascribing to
Mansfield an interest in natural law. For indeed, quite to the contrary,
Crosskey might be better accused of unjustly depreciating the importance of natural law for Mansfield and those under his influence. In his
brief account of the theory of natural law, Crosskey is careful to use
words such as "assumed," "supposed," and "hypothetical," which imply
that he treats these ideas because they were prevalent in the eighteenth
century, but that he himself doubts their validity. 1 ' Also, we saw
previously that even in citing the passage in the Tyson case in which
Story invokes the Ciceronian conception of natural law, Crosskey tries to
explain Story's position as based solely on positive law rather than
"juristic metaphysics."'3 2
B.

The common law in colonial history

Goebel is satisfied that he has demolished the "philosophical scaffold"
that Crosskey tries to erect in Chapter 18; so he dedicates the second
part of his review to Chapter 19 (" 'The Common Law' and the
Administration of Justice in Eighteenth-Century America"). Crosskey
uses this chapter to present most of his historical evidence pertaining to
the status of the English common law in America before 1787.
Goebel thinks that to a large extent Crosskey's mistaken views about
the reception of the common law into America result from his not
properly understanding "the constitutional principles upon which England's American empire was founded and which with slight alteration
obtained down to independence.' 133 According to Goebel, the American colonies were assumed to have been acquired by conquest under the
legal fiction that the Indians were perpetual enemies since they were
Letter from Justice Story to A.D. Alois, February 15, 1832, on file in Story Papers, Yale
University, quoted in McCLELLAN, supra note 24, at 182-83. See also Story, A
Discourse on the Past History, Present State, and Future Prospects of the Law, in id. at
329-31.
In addition to the passage from Wilson's writing quoted in the text, see 2 WmSON,
supra note 35, at 813.
131. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 565-69. See Petro, supra note 9, at 323-24.
132. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
133. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 460.
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infidels. Therefore, the colonies were the possessions of the King and
were not entitled to the English common law. 18 4 He thinks that these
principles of the English empire were set forth in Calvin's Case.l s
There, English lands outside the Realm of England were presumed to be
the property of the Crown by virtue of conquest. Hence, they were
governed by the King's prerogative rather than by the laws of England,
until such laws were formally introduced, at which time only Parliament
could alter the laws. 136 However, there was a distinction between conquered Christian lands and conquered infidel lands: in the latter, all
native law was abolished, while in the former, existing law remained
until changed by the King.
The officers of the Crown, Goebel explains, were careful to avoid
introducing the common law into the colonies, which would have nullified royal prerogative and established Parliament as the ruling body over
the colonies. Goebel argues that the provisions of the colonial charters
requiring that the colonial legislative power be exercised in accordance
with the laws of England did not institute the common law: "the law
of England as such did not obtain in the plantations, but.

. .

it was a

standard to7 which, all things being equal, their own law ought to
comply.'

'8

Goebel is justified in criticizing Crosskey for ignoring the doctrine of
Calvin's Case in its application to the colonies. But it is questionable
whether the mere existence of this doctrine refutes Crosskey's thesis as
to the common law in America; Goebel himself admits that this doctrine provoked opposition both in England and America from those
who believed that the colonies were entitled to English law. Chief
Justice Holt, while applying the doctrine of Calvin's Case in referring to
Virginia as a conquered land, in Smith v. Brown,138 also distinguished
in Blankard v. Galdy,139 between the case of an uninhabited country
settled by Englishmen, in which all the laws of England would be
in force, and that of a conquered country, in which English law would
apply only when so decreed by the King. Goebel himself indicated that
the theory stated by Holt in Blankard v. Galdy, which was restated by
134. Id. at 460-61. See Goebel, The Matrix of Empire, in APPEALS TO THE PRM
CouNciL, supra note 100, at xiii-vii, xxii-iv, xlvii-xi. See also GoEDEL, supra note 20, at
36.
135. 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
136. The doctrine of royal dominion over conquered infidel lands was reaffirmed in
East India Company v. Sandys, 10 How. St. Tr. 371 (1811).
137. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 461-63. See Goebel, supra note 11, at 7, 11.
138. 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. 1705).
139. 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1693). See text accompanying notes 169-79 infra.
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the Privy Council in 1722,140 was a popular alternative to the conquest
theory of Calvin's Case.141 In the process of making what he apparent-

ly thinks is a criticism of Crosskey, Goebel declares that the legal
practice of the colonies after 1696 evinces "a steady assimilation of
common law procedures and substantive doctrine," and thus he affirms

Crosskey's main contention! In fact, he pushes the point farther than
does Crosskey himself, because, as we have seen, Crosskey concedes that

the legal practice of the colonies, especially during the early years, was
in many ways unfavorable to an effective reception of the common law.
Goebel apparently thinks that by arguing that the colonial courts

adopted the common law, he is refuting Crosskey's view of colonial law
as "a rude sort of memory jurisprudence." Crosskey does speak of "undigested, incomplete, and highly inaccessible handwritten 'records,' ",142
but, as noted earlier, 4 ' this is in reference to the attempts by colonial
140. 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (P.C. 1722). See J.GOEBEL, CASES
D MATERIALS ON THE
DEVELOPMmNT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 300-01 (1931); APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL
supra note 100, at 482-83.
141. Holt's dictum . . . had considerable effect. . . . Crown, law officers expressed the belief that the common law obtained in the colonies, and colonial lawyers did likewise. There is no question: but that in all the colonies from 1696 onward practice in the courts indicated. a steady assimilation of common law procedures and substantive doctrine. The picture painted by Mr. Crosskey of law in the
colonies as a rude sort of memory jurisprudence with "undigested, incomplete, and
highly inaccessible handwritten 'records'" is fabrication ....
[M]n provinces such
as New York, Virginia and South Carolina, the superior courts on the common law
side achieved a more than passable facsimile of the practice in the English Central
Courts. Here and elsewhere the sources of English law, from the Yearbooks down
to the latest available statutes and reports, were used as a sort of thesaurisfuris.
Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 463-64 (footnotes omitted). Some of the details of the
shift in English policy concerning the colonies from the conquest theory can be found in
GOEBEL, supra note 20, at 1-2, 7, 51, 60-72, 83-84, 88, 175; 1 POWNALL, supra note 90,
at 46-67, 120-36, 142-55, 165-80; 2 id. at 5-6, 28-29, 34-39, 45-48, 76-79; APPEALS TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 473-87, 520-22."
Consider Washburn, Law and Authority in Colonial Virginia, in LAw AND AuTourm
IN COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 21.
Essential to the thinking of the mother country from the first project to establish
settlements in the New World down to the final break with the colonies was the
assumption that they could be incorporated "within the Realm" in terms of individual rights if not in terms of imperial policy.
Id. at 119-20.
St. George Tucker, disputing Blackstone's application of the conquest theory to the
American colonies, reasoned that since in most cases the Indians withdrew as the English
settlers arrived, the settlers brought their law with them as though they were entering
uninhabited lands; and he observed that even if the colonies were conquered lands, the
English immigrants, being of the conquerors rather than the conquered, could not be
justly deprived of their English law by the King. Tucker, supra note 35, at 381-86. See
also OTIs, supra note 81, at 35-38, 48-52, 56-58, 65-70, 77-78, 81, 92-93, 98-99, 106-08,
112.
142. I CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 588. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
143. See text following note 96 supra.
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courts to establish local colonial customary law as a substitute for
English common law. Due to this absence of published reports of
colonial cases, the colonial courts had to rely on the common law that
they found in English law books. It is hard to see how Goebel can
dispute this since he also emphasizes the reliance of colonial jurists on
English law reports and describes the "native jurisprudence" of the
colonies as a "memory jurisprudence" resting on "oral tradition.""'
Goebel must sense that the "steady assimilation" of the common law
and the colonial use of English law books as a "thesauris juris" tended
to buttress Crosskey's case, for he immediately adds the following
qualifications:
There is no justification, however, in assuming from this that there was
any belief in the existence of a general and pervasive imperial law.
Neither is there any justification for asserting that such a body of law
was being everywhere administered with only small and insignificant
45
local deviations.'
He gives three reasons for denying these two assumptions. First, because of the absence of certain administrative controls over the courts
during the early years, "there was perpetuated much non-Central Court
English law dating from the time of first settlement and derived from
the imitation of English local law."' 40 Second, some colonies allowed
"drastic divagations from the common law practice.' 4 Finally, there
was confusion as to the applicability of some English statutes connected
to the common law. 14 8 Goebel goes on to argue that the variations in
colonial law prevented the establishment of "a general law common to
all the colonies"' 4 9 because there was no central supervisory agency over
the courts. Even the Privy Council failed to provide sufficient supervision of colonial law. In addition, the law in each colony was regarded
by the colonists themselves as autonomous.' 50
144. GOEBEL, supra note 20, at 6, 112, 503.
145. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 464.
146. Id.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id. at 464-66. Goebel's comments here about the Privy Council contradict his
criticism a few pages earlier of Crosskey's conclusion that the appeals to the Privy
Council failed to enforce legal uniformity in colonial law. Id. at 462. See I Cnossuy,
supra note 1, at 587. Compare GoEBEL, supra note 20, at 41. Petro remarks:
'[l]t would seem to make little difference whether the appeals to the privy council
had been an effective unifying device. If they had been, as the reviewer asserts,
that would be no sign that the colonists would not want such a unifying principle
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The second assumption denied by Goebel, that a general body of
colonial law was applied everywhere "with only small and insignificant
local deviations," also is denied by Crosskey, contrary to Goebel's implication. Goebel and Crosskey agree that colonial legal practice departed
in diverse ways from the standards of the English common law, but they
disagree as to the significance of this fact. Goebel takes it as proof that
the common law was not the general law of the colonies; Crosskey takes
it as showing the difficulty of actualizing in practice the legal supremacy
that the colonists accorded the common law in principle. 151
Therefore, the question involves not the second assumption mentioned by Goebel, but the first-"that there was any belief in the
existence of a general and pervasive imperial law." Does not Goebel
give an advantage to his opponent by speaking of a belief in the
existence of such a law rather than simply its existence? Crosskey is
forced to show that in their beliefs or attitudes, colonial leaders were
"receptive" to the common law even when the actual "reception" of it
was a practical impossibility. This difficulty in practical application
was particularly shown during the early period of colonial history, and
although conditions in the 1760's and afterwards favored adoption of
the common law into American legal practice, variations in the legal
systems of the colonies and the states continued to prevent uniformity in
the law. Therefore, up to 1787, the common law as the general
uniform law of America must be explained by Crosskey as "existing'
largely in the aspirations of colonial leaders until the Constitution
allowed its existence in actuality. Hence, Goebers evidence of variation in the application of the common law does not refute Crosskey's
thesis that, despite such diversity, this law was regarded as the general
customary law of all America, especially in the light of Goebel's own
admission as to the inclination towards "a steady assimilation of com152
mon law procedures and substantive doctrine.'
to continue when they were on their own. If they had not been, as the author contends, the desire for a unifying principle might be considered even stronger.
Petro, supra note 9, at 325-26.
151. Petro adequately stated the issue in defending Crosskey:
Goebel's fundamental contention seems to be that the fact of local deviations makes
untenable Crosskey's conclusion that the common law of England was basically and
generally applicable in the American colonies. ....
On the contrary, "divagation"
(the word Goebel prefers) presupposes something "divaged from."
Petro, supra note 9, at 329.
152. See note 56 supra. Horwitz, supra note 20, at 1081, observes that Goebel "does
not consider that despite an acutal diversity of common law practice there may have
been a strong ideological assumption of common law uniformity."
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The common law and the-American Revolution

Goebel's disagreement with Crosskey on the significance of legal
diversity in America, reappears in the third part of his review, which
concerns Crosskey's view of the effects of the American Revolution on
the common law.153 Crosskey must argue-that the Revolution did not
diminish the importance of the common law, but rather that the states,
through the pertinent statutory and 'constitutional provisions, ratified
and reaffirmed its existence as fundamental law. But Goebel reasons
that because the states declared merely the continuance of their existing
legal systems, with, all of their diversity and departures from English
law, this proves there was no single, uniform common law in America.
Crosskey, although acknowledging that the states sanctioned the common law only as it had been made applicable to their local conditions,
accentuates the lack of any references to local systems of law. Although the states applied the English common law differently, it was
still the same legal source for all. Their legal peculiarities had not
become so fixed as to constitute autonomous, local forms of common
law-they still used English law reports as the basis of their customary
law. 5 4 Crosskey, at one point in his book,155 presents his interpretation of the Revolution's effect on the common law in America with
reference to the views of St. George Tucker (as stated in his essay on the
adoption of the common law that he appended to his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1803),'0 which Goebel accuses Crosskey of
distorting, in order "to prove his point out of the mouth of a staunch
57
States' Rights man."'
Tucker inferred from the variations in the application of the common
law among the colonies that there was -no uniform customary law during
any period from the dates of the first settlements to the time of the
Revolution. 5 8 He then contended that after the Revolution all aspects
of the English common law that had not been brought into "use and
practice" in the colonies, were "obsolete" and "incapable of revival,
except by constitutional, or legislative authority."
This was true be153. Ex ParteClio, supra note 6, at 467:
154. I CnossE y, supra note 1,at 595-99; Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 467-68. For
a detailed survey of the use of English court decisions by the state courts in accordance
with the reception provisions of their respective states see GoEnBL, supra note 20, at 10918.
155. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 634-38.
156. Tucker, supra note 35, at 378.
157. Ex parte Clio, supra note 6, at 469.
158. Tucker, supranote 35, at 405.
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cause "they no longer possessed even a potential existence, (as being the
laws of the British nation, and as such, extending, in theoretical strictness, to the remotest part of the empire) because the connexion, upon
which this theoretical conclusion might have been founded, was entirely
at an end."' 159 Since each state became sovereign and independent,
there was no common law amongst them but the general law of nations,
to which all civilized nations conform. . . . And how much soever
their municipal institutions might agree, one with another, yet as it was
in the power of their legislatures, respectively, to alter the whole, or any
part of them, whenever they should think proper, therefore, such coincidence by no means established a common rule amongst them ....160
Even if all the states adopted the common law, thereby producing "a
general conformity in their municipal codes," the adoption would be
"the separate act of each state" and, therefore, would not create a
national law superior to the laws of each state. 1 61
Crosskey observes that the "coincidence" of the "municipal institutions" of the states would establish a "common rule" in fact, but that
Tucker apparently wished to distinguish this factual legal commonality
from a commonality enforced by a central legislative power superior to
the state legislatures. Thus, Crosskey summarizes Tucker's theory as
follows:
[I]n a country living under a system of law, common in fact, and common, also, in his special, legalistic sense of being subject to alteration
by a single central legislative power, a political revolution that sets up,
instead, thirteen separate regional legislative powers, necessarily transforms the pre-existing single system of common law, into thirteen separate systems that are uncommon, in his legalistic sense of being thereafter separately and independently alterable, and only so alterable, in
each of the thirteen separated regions, although, of course, the law of
all these regions would remain common in fact, until such alterations
should occur, and, even then, would continue common in fact, to the
extent that any parts of the pre-existing law might be continued unal1 62
tered.
Crosskey makes the further point, which he seems to regard as a
necessary implication of Tucker's comments, that even the parts of the
"pre-existing factually common customary law"'163 that were displaced
by the sovereign state legislatures would continue to exist in potentiality:
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id.
I CnossEnY, supra note 1, at 635.

163. Id.
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•For, despite such displacements, it would everywhere still be the law
that the courts would apply if the legislation displacing it should be repealed. This continuing potential existence of customary law, in spite
of legislation displacing it, is a well-recognized characteristic of this type
of law that cannot properly be overlooked. For it means that legislative
displacements of customary law do not destroy it as potential law: it
still remains, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, in 1807, "the substratum
of [the] laws [of the country].'

64

That Crosskey has distorted Tucker's opinions, as Goebel claims, is
quite clear. Tucker denies emphatically that there was in America
before the Revolution a "factually common customary law;" although he
concedes that before the Revolution the whole of the English common
law might have had a "potential existence" in the colonies, he emphasizes the legal diversity that prevented the actual existence of such a
uniform general law. Also, Tucker does not affirm the existence "in

fact" of a national common law after the Revolution. Rather he speaks
of the existence of such a coincidentally common law as purely hypothetical (i.e., if two or more of the states had adopted the common law

in the same form, then the established law would have been common in
fact for the states involved).' 65
Crosskey insists that Tucker's conception of the legal consequences of
the American Revolution is "a correct application of the ancient principle of Blankard v. Galdy."' 66 According to Crosskey, this case established that "when a political revolution occurs in a country, its pre164. Id. at 634-35. Crosskey restates this conception of "potential existence" in criticizing Tucker's assumption that the states were prior to the Union:
Mhe Union, in fact, was older than the states; and there never had been a time
since its first formation, in 1774, when there had not been many matters of a Continental kind-matters arising, for example, under the resolutions and contracts of
the Continental Congress--which, from their nature, could only have been decided
by some law of the whole country ... And the only law the whole country had,
was the law it had inherited from England. So, in spite of the scarcity of surviving
evidence, there hardly can be a doubt that there must always have been an actually
functioning national Common Law as to a great many matters; and as the national
matters increased in variety (as of course they did in 1789), that law, always existent in potentiality,must have expanded in its actually functioning scope.
Id. at 638 (emphasis added). The scarcity of the "surviving evidence" of the "actual
functioning national Common Law" under the Articles of Confederation is evidenced by
Crosskey's citation of only one piece of evidence: he refers to James Wilson's opinion,
recorded in Madison's records of the Constitutional Convention, that the Continental
Court of Appeals in Cases of Captures decided "facts as well as law & Common as well
as Civil law." II id. at 1346 n.43. See 2 REcoRDs oF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 431
(M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as REcoRDs]. Petro is surely wrong in
regarding this as sufficient substantiation for Crosskey's theory of the Union. Petro,
supra note 9, at 333-34. See also Ex ParteClio, supra note 6, at 470-71.
165. I CRossKBY, supra note 1, at 636.
166. Id.
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existing law continues unaltered, except to the extent that the revolution
expressly alters it or alters it by necessary implication."'167 But the
subject matter of this case seems so unrelated to revolutions that Goebel
concludes that Crosskey has never read the case!' 6 ' The issue was
whether Jamaica was governed by English law or by its own law. Chief
Justice Holt ruled that although Englishmen settling in a previously
uninhabited land carry their law with them, Jamaica was a conquered
land, and hence "the laws of England did not take place there, until
declared so by the conqueror or his successors."' 16 9
Crosskey does not explain clearly how Blankard v. Galdy supports
the principle he attributes to it. Yet he does cite, in connection with this
case, the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Chapman 70 and a
passage in Grotius' De Jure Belli et Pacis.'7 ' Perhaps a study of these
three texts in juxtaposition, to see what they have in common, will
clarify Crosskey's meaning.
In Commonwealth v. Chapman, a case concerning the common law
of libel, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that the provision of
the state constitution declaring the continuance after the American
Revolution of the existing laws, presumably including the common law
insofar as it was applicable, "was rather of an existing rule, than the
72
enactment of a new one."'
We take it to be a well settled principle, acknowledged by all civilized
states governed by law that by means of a political revolution, by which
the political organization is changed, the municipal laws, regulating their
social relations, duties and rights, are not necessarily abrogated. They
remain in force, except so far as they are repealed or modified by the
1
new sovereign authority. '
Crosskey cites Book 2, Chapter 9, sections 8 and 9, of Grotius' book.
The title of the Chapter is "When Empires [imperia] or Dominions
[domina] Cease." Grotius explains that "the law (or rights) of a
167. Id.
168. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 636; Ex Parle Clio, supra note 6, at 471-72.
Although believing Crosskey's citation of this case to be mistaken, Petro dismisses it as a
trivial oversight. But Crosskey's appeals to "the Common Law rule of Blankard v.
Galdy" are too numerous and too important to be so easily glossed over. Petro, supra
note 9, at 332-33. See I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 594, 636-38, 650, 657, 818, 825,
869, 871, 876, 898.
169. 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1693). See text accompanying notes 134-41 supra.
170. 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 68 (1847).
171. I CRossxnY, supra note 1, at 636; II id. at 1346 nn.40-41.
172. I id. at 72.
173. 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 68, 71, 72 (1847).
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people" (ius populi) cease only when the people itself ceases. A people
"is of the genus of bodies that consists of distinct parts that is subject

to one name"; it is "an artificial body" (section 3). Hence, a people
ceases with the extinction of "the essential parts" of its body (section 4);
of its "body as a whole" (section 5); or of its essential spirit or "form"
(forma) (section 6). He then states that a people is not extinguished by
migration (section 7) or by a change of "regime" (regiminis) (section

8) and that a union of peoples does not destroy but rather combines the
"rights" (Jura) of each (section 9).
These remarks by Grotius indicate the commonality between Blankard v. Galdy and Commonwealth v. Chapman seen by 'Crosskey:

both cases rely implicitly on the principle that a "people" keeps its
laws so long as its identity as a "people" is unchanged. The English
colonists did not lose their English law by migration to America (Blank-

ard v. Galdy) or even by revolution against the English monarchy
(Commonwealth v. Chapman) because in both cases they remained the
same "people."

Underlying the principle here employed is the distinc-

tion between civil society and political organization:
a populus, as a
social entity, can persist despite changes from one political regime to
another.
It is significant, therefore, that Crosskey is careful to refer to the
American Revolution as a "politicalrevolution," which implicitly distinguishes it from a "social revolution." The Revolution dissolved America's political relations with.England without dissolving the social relations among the American people and the English law that regulated

those relations.'

74

174. Goebel explains the continued acceptance of English law in America after the
Revolution by referring to "the prevailing consensus that in time of revolution it was
desirable to maintain the private law in a state of stability." 1 GoEBEL, supra note 20, at
120.
The principle under discussion was stated by John Marshall: When our ancestors
migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new situation; and I do not conceive that
the Revolution would, in any degree, have changed the relations of man to man,
or the law which regulated those relations. In breaking our political connection
with the parent state, we did not break off our connection with each other. It remained subject to the ancient rules, until those rules should be changed by the competent authority.
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
James Sullivan, denying that the common law should be considered a law imposed on
America by a foreign nation, argues "that the general principles of right and wrong,
between individuals in civil society, are nearlylthe same in all countries, however they
may differ as to the rights between the supreme power and the people." SULLIVAN, supra
note 35, at 14. See note 109 supra.
Finally, is it not clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence that a "people" can
discard a form of government while retainihg theiridentity as a "people"?
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Before the Revolution there was in America, Crosskey seems to
believe, a "single system of common law" that was "common in fact."
The political revolution of 1776, by transforming the colonies into
independently sovereign states, deprived America of the legal supervision of a supreme central body (a place previously filled by Parliament),
which was necessary for insuring uniformity in the common law. But
even while the state legislatures were free to displace portions of the
previously uniform common law, there was still "an actually functioning
national Common Law" with respect to "many matters of a Continental
kind"; and even the displaced portions of the pre-existing common law
continued to exist "in potentiality" until the ratification of the Constitution allowed this law to resume its prior existence in actuality.,7 5
Heice, the adoption of the Constitution, Crosskey infers, was America's second political revolution, which restored the common law to the
national uniformity that had been jeopardized by the first revolution.
That event re-created for the thirteen American states a single central
legislative power, even though it left the separate legislative powers of
the several states largely intact in a subordinate way, as they had been
when the states were colonies under the British Empire. There was,
in other words, a substantial return to the situation that had existed bethe new American
fore the American Revolution occurred; but 1with
76
Congress substituted for the British 'Parliament.
So the legal identity of Americans, their constitution as a populus, arose
first, Crosskey thinks, in the submission of the colonists to the English
common law as authoritatively interpreted by Parliament. After the
revolutionary break from England, this previously uniform national law
existed as "potential law" (with large portions continuing to exist even
in actual practice) until, by the adoption of the Constitution, which
established political arrangements analogous to those before 1776 (with
the United States Congress in the place of Parliament), Americans
reaffirmed their actual legal submission to the English common law as
their uniform national law insofar as it was applicable to their situation.
It was previously noted that Crosskey conceded that the circumstances in the colonies hindered the full reception of the common law in
the actual practice of colonial law. The adoption of the common law
into the colonies seemed to be more a matter of "receptiveness" to
English law than actual reception in practice. Presumably the common
law was the uniform general law of the country only "in potentiality."
175. I CRossKY, supra note 1, at 635-36.
176. Id. at 636.
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Yet, it now seems that Crosskey believes the English common law (as
interpreted by Parliament) to have been the actually functioning general
law of the colonies. The existence of this law "in potentiality" was
necessary only between 1776 and 1789, i.e., during the period when the
common law was not supported in its uniform application by a single
supreme legislative body.
But how then does Crosskey account for the diversity in the adoption
of the common law by the colonies? Apparently he conceives this
variation as similar to the local law in England, which departed from the
common law as administered for the entire kingdom by the King's
central courts. The necessity for legal variation as required by diversity
in local circumstances was a fundamental principle of the English
common law; hence, the existence in the American colonies of local
variations in the application of this law would not have vitiated its
uniformity in national matters, for, as Crosskey says, "the Common
Law, with its British statutory improvements .... was plainly
thought of as the general law of all America: the departures from it
only were looked upon as local.""'
D. Royal prerogativeand the enumeratedpowers of Congress
Crosskey's historical survey of the common law's development in
America before the ratification of the Constitution provides only historical background for his explication of certain parts of the Constitution
that imply, according to his interpretation, the existence of a national
common law. Goebel generally ignores Crosskey's exegesis of the
Constitution in evaluating Crosskey's thesis concerning the adoption of
the common law, and instead he concentrates his attention on the
historical survey. Yet he does devote the last three sections of his
review to criticizing Crosskey's contention that the inclusion of certain
powers among the enumerated powers of Congress 178 implies the existence of those portions of the common law pertaining to royal prerogative. Even on this point, however, he chooses to dispute a few of
Crosskey's historical arguments rather than the arguments based on the
actual wording of the Constitution.
Crosskey claims that although the enumerated powers of Congress
appear at first glance to be an odd list with much repetition, their
177. Id. at 599. See id. at 578-79, 634-35, 639, 661, 818-19. Does Crosskey's use of
"thought of" in the passage quoted here suggest that he continues to rely more on the
"receptiveness" of colonial attitudes than on the "reception" into colonial legal practice?
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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articulation with one another and with the rest of the Constitution
becomes clear when the reasons for listing them are properly understood.' 9 Of the twenty-nine powers contained in article I, he identifies thirteen as belonging to the "executive" as described by Blackstone
in his treatment of royal prerogative. 180 These thirteen had to be
enumerated, he argues, because they would otherwise have been regarded as "executive" powers under the pertinent "standing law,"'18 i.e., the
parts of the English common law dealing with royal prerogative applicable to America.
But Goebel denies, in the fourth section of his review, that royal
prerogative was part of America's "standing law." He notes that much
of the conflict with England concerned colonial resistance to the King's
prerogative powers and therefore the states were careful to abrogate the
prerogative powers by appropriating them to themselves. Goebel contends, since the states in 1787 were exercising these powers formerly
belonging to the King, "any enumeration of quondam royal prerogative
was an enumeration as against the states.' 8 2
One could reply to Goebel by observing that despite the tradition of
American resistance to royal prerogative, the Framers might still have
felt a need to enumerate certain "executive" powers as belonging to the
Congress for fear that they might otherwise belong to the President.
' 8
Since the Constitution grants to the President "the executive Power, 11
it would have seemed natural to interpret this power by comparison with
the executive prerogative of the King of England. This is confirmed by
St. George Tucker, who observed that although the American Revolution abolished the "lex prerogativa," some of the enumerated powers of
Congress were drawn from royal prerogative.8 4 Similarly, Alexander
Hamilton, in denying that the Constitution gave the President powers
comparable to those of the English King, points out that many of the
powers of the King were expressly delegated to the Congress. 8 5 One is
entitled to conclude, therefore, that it is quite likely that certain powers
179. I CRossKEY,supra note 1, at 381-83.
180. Although Crosskey assumes Blackstone to have been the chief authority on royal
prerogative for the Framers, he thinks they also had other sources of information since
Blackstone sometimes mixed legal "fictions" and "historical sketches" into his descriptions of existing law. Id. at 415-16.
181. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 474-76.

182. Id. at 476.

183. U.S. COSNT. art.HI.
184. Tucker, supra note 35, at 405-06, 413-16.
185. THE FEDErAusT No. 69, at 415-16 (New American Lib. ed. 1961)
ton).

(A. Hamil-
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were included among the enumerated powers of Congress as a precaution against their being considered inherently "executive" powers.
Goebel, in the fifth section of his essay, subjects to particular criticism
Crosskey's explanation of the military powers of Congress 8 6 as powers
that would have belonged to "the executive Power" if they had not been
enumerated. He rebukes Crosskey for using the section of Blackstone's
Commentaries on royal prerogatives without citing the subsequent passages on the withdrawal of some of the military prerogatives from the
King by Parliament.1 7 In addition, he accuses Crosskey of neglecting
the pertinent facts of American history, such as the colonial trespasses
on the royal military prerogative and the exercise of military powers by
the states under the Articles of Confederation.' 88 Since the executive
prerogative in military matters was abolished in America, Goebel reasons, Crosskey's theory of the enumeration of the military powers of
Congress as a limitation on "the executive Power" is without founda18 9
tion.
First-as to Crosskey's alleged misuse of Blackstone-it should be
noted that Blackstone, in the passage cited by Goebel, describes the
military powers of Parliament without indicating that the military prerogatives of the King had been drastically reduced.1 0 Second, as with
his previous argument, one might answer Goebel by insisting that the
opposition first of the colonies and then the states to executive control of
military matters would not have necessarily eliminated the need for the
Framers of the Constitution to enumerate these powers in Article I so as
to insure that they would not be considered part of "the executive
Power." Indeed, American resistance to executive military prerogative
made it even more probable that the men at the Convention would have
used enumeration of the congressional powers to prevent any misinterpretation of "the executive Power."
But Goebel's most elaborate critique, in the sixth and final section of
his review,' 9 ' is reserved for Crosskey's theory that the power over
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

U.S. CoNsr. art. I.
Ex ParteClio, supra note 6, at 477. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 414.
Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 477.
Id. at 477-78.
1 BLAcKSrONE, supra note 25, at 414.
Deserving of notice is a footnote by Goebel in which he seems to dispute a small

point in Crosskey's study of prerogative:

It is difficult indeed to resist dispatching an arrow at the suggestion . . . that comprehended in the power to constitute courts was the royal prerogative to appoint
fairs and markets because the fair privilege anciently included the right to a court
piepower-an institution long as dead as mutton.
Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 467 n.12. This insinuation that Crosskey was ignorant of
the fact that courts of piepower had ceased to exist, is clearly unjustified. For Crosskey
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piracies and marine felonies would also have been an "executive" power
if it had not been listed as a power of Congress. Crosskey's central
contention, which Goebel denies, is that American lawyers in 1787
would have considered piracy trials as being subject, at least potentially,
to "executive' control since it had been technically possible in the
American colonies for such trials to be conducted in Admiralty Courts
controlled by the Crown rather than in common law courts. 1 92 Crosskey supports this theory with a review of certain events in English legal
history that may be summarized as follows.
In 1361 Edward lI revoked a commission for trying a case of piracy
according to the common law and declared:
[I]t appears that, according to the law and custom of our realm, felonies,
trespasses, or injuries done upon the sea ought not to be dealt with or
determined before our Justices at the common law, but before our Ad93
mirals according to the maritime law.,
Crosskey suspects that the Kings of England wished to use the Admiralty Courts to provide lenient treatment for the "Rovers of the Sea." He
quotes R. G. Marsden's observation that
a sovereign who was largely dependent upon them [the 'rovers'] for a
navy and transports was not unwilling to wink at or encourage, even
in times of nominal peace, private enterprise at sea which might give
him an advantage over a neighbor with whom he might shortly be at
war. 19
But the ineffectiveness of the Admiralty Courts in punishing piracy
provoked recommendations for returning piracy cases to the common
law courts. Finally, two acts were passed in 1535195 and 1536196
emphasizes this fact and cites the same account by Holdsworth to which Goebel refers.
Crosskey denies Blackstone's statement that the royal power of "establishing markets and
fairs" was part of the King's power over commerce; Crosskey infers that since the right
to hold a market or fair involved establishment of a court of piepower, the King's power
over markets and fairs was a part, not of his commercial power, but of his "right of
erecting courts of judicature." Crosskey thinks, however, that the framers of the
Constitution did not have to be concerned about what to do with this particular
,,executive" power since the King no longer exercised it because courts of piepower had
disappeared. So he is in full agreement on this point with Goebel. I CRossKEY, supra
note 1, at 441-42; II id. at 1328 n.58. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 540 (4th ed. 1938).
192. I CnossxnY, supra note 1, at 446-47.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id., quoting 1 R. MARSDEN, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA viii (1915) [hereinafter cited as MARSDEN].
195. 27 Hen. VII, c. 4.
196. 28 Hen. VHI, c. 15.
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removing marine offenses from the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. Trials
were to be conducted in England under the ordinary laws of the land
7
before juries and with judges holding special commissions .
The requirement that piracies and marine felonies be tried in England
however was very inconvenient for the American colonies.10 s To solve
this problem, a new statute was passed in 1700199 which was expressly
applied to the colonies, and which permitted piracies and marine felonies.to be tried
in any place at sea, or upon the land, in any of his Majesty's islands,
plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or factories, to be appointed
for that purpose by the King's commission or commissions under the
200
great seal of England, or the seal of the admiralty of England.
Crosskey interperts this to mean that since such trials could be conducted either at sea or on the land, and under either the Great Seal
or the Admiralty Seal, it would have been possible for trials to be
totally under the control of the Admiralty and, since the Admiralty
Court was the court of the Royal Navy, thus subject to the "executive"
power. 20 1 He concedes, however, that the uniform practice under the
act of 1700 was to conduct trials through the civil powers rather than
the Admiralty. Yet he insists that any colonist who had read the act
would have concluded that trials under the Admiralty jurisdiction were
legally possible, but that the Crown had passed over this alternative for
reasons of policy.202
Even if Crosskey were correct in maintaining that piracy trials in the
colonies were potentially subject to the "executive" power as represented
197. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 446-48. See MARSDEN, srupra note 194, at vii-viii, x
xiii, xxii, 84-88.
198. Some colonists regarded the acts of 1535 and 1536 as inapplicable to their
circumstances, and thus they returned to the older English law providing for trials in
Admiralty Courts, except where colonial legislation established alternative procedures. I
CRossKEY, supra note 1, 449-50. Goebel states that
plantation vice-admiralty courts undertook to try pirates by virtue of vice-admiralty
commission without reference to the 1536 statute. But the Lords Committee of the
Privy Council refused to countenance such trials by local vice-admiralty courts and
sent over commissions pursuant to the Act. Mr. Crosskey does not mention this.
Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 479 (footnotes omitted). But Goebel's statement
that Crosskey overlooks this Privy Council decision is incorrect. See II Caossxriy, supra
note 1, at 1329 n.78; Petro, supra note 9, at 342. Furthermore, he does not contest
Crosskey's main point here, which is that some of the colonies, despite the opposition of
the English authorities, tried piracies and marine felonies in Admiralty Courts.
199. 11 & 12 Will. m, c. 7.
200. Id. § 14.
201. I CaossKEy, supra note 1, at 45.
202. Id. at 450-53.
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in the Admiralty Courts, it would seem that the Afierican Revolution
abolished this use of the "executive" power since article IX of the
Articles of Confederation gave the power of "appointing courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas" to the Continental
Congress. Crosskey argues, however, that the powers of the Continental Congress were "of a highly mixed character," and included some
that were ordinarily considered to be "executive" powers. He then
contends that the Constitution's nullification of the Articles of Confederation restored the relevant English statutes concerning the trial of
' 20 3
piracies as the "standing law.
As to what the members of the Constitutional Convention thought
about the power over piracy trials, Crosskey makes two somewhat
plausible arguments, neither of which is mentioned by Goebel. First,
one reason for believing that the Framers feared that the power over
crimes committed at sea could be construed as an "executive" power, is
that there had been a close connection in the minds of the colonists
between piracy and privateering. This made it likely that piracy had
been considered as much a subject for "executive" power as privateering
had been. 20 4 Second, Crosskey finds significance in the changes made
in the piracy and marine felonies clause during the drafting of the
Constitution. It began as the power "to declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas"; it was
changed to a power "to punish" such offenses; finally it was changed
again to the power "to define and punish" these crimes. These alterations would have been unnecessary, Crosskey infers, if the intention had
been to secure this power for Congress as against the states because the
original form of the clause would have sufficiently accomplished this
purpose. Thus, there must have been some other reason for enumerating this power in precisely the words finally chosen. He suggests that
"to declare the law and punishment" sounded too much like a "legislative" power for some of the Framers, whereas "to define and punish"
conveyed the desired implication of an "executive" power.20 5
203. Id. at 454.
204. Id. at 454-55.
[Wilde as is the legal distinction between the authorized warfare of the privateer
and the unauthorized violence of the pirate, in practice it was very difficult to keep
the privateer and his crew, far from the eye of authority, within the bounds of legal
conduct, or to prevent him from broadening out his operations into piracy, especially if a merely privateering cruise was proving unprofitable.
J.JAMESON, PRIVATEERING AND PIRACY IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD iX (1923).
205. I CRosSKEY, supra note 1, at 444-45; 2 REcoRDs, supra note 164, at 182, 312,

320.
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Goebel begins his criticisms by challenging Crosskey's view of the Admiralty Court as "the Navy's court." He cites "the great variety of matter
(including commercial transactions) over which the Admiralty Court
had jurisdiction" and "the fact that in the 16th century the judges were
doctors of civil law. ' 20
But it is hard to see how these facts refute
Crosskey's essential argument that the Admiralty Court was more closely allied to the "executive" power of the King than were the common
law courts. Crosskey might be wrong in regarding the Admiralty Court
as simply a branch of the Royal Navy, but even here Goebel does not
discredit the following remark by Benedict, 07 on which Crosskey relies:
In the earlier history of nations, when absolute rule and strong executive powers have exercised most of the functions of government, the
affairs of the sea and of navigable waters of the nation, have been usually administered by a naval officer of the highest dignity and station,
holding his authority directly from the sovereign power, subordinate to
the monarch alone, and clothed with many of the prerogatives of roy8
alty.20
Goebel also criticizes Crosskey's interpretation of the act of 1700 by
referring to an opinion rendered to the King in 1720 by his law officers:
they concluded that the act did not allow piracy trials under the
Admiralty jurisdiction. But he does not deal with Crosskey's contention
that these men ignored the literal meaning of the text.20
As they
stated:
[W]e conceive that, though the Act uses the words 'any place at sea or
upon the land in any of his Majesty's islands, plantations etc,' the intent
was only to give a liberty for trying pirates on shipboard, on the coast
of a plantation or colony, without laying a necessity upon the command210
ers of ships to being them on shoar .
The language of the key provision of this act, which we quoted above, 211
clearly indicates that trials can be held either "in any place at sea or
206. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 479. See 1 SELECr PLE&s IN THE COURT OF
ADmIRALTY lixii (E. Marsden ed. 1894).
207. E. BENEDICT, THE Aiv.iucAN ADMIRALTY (1894).

208. Id. at 2. See I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 448; II id. at 1329 n.75. Marsden
speaks of "the dependence of the Admiralty Court upon the crown, the Lord Admiral,
the council, and the executive generally." MARsDEN, supra note 194, at xxii. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADmnuALTY 9 (1957), wherein the authors observe
that the Admiralty Court, in its early history, aroused "the dislike of those who feared it
as a prerogative court."
209. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 480-81.
210. 2 MARsDEN, supra note 194, at 254.

211. See text accompanying notes 198-202 supra.
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upon the land in any of his Majesty's islands, plantations, colonies,
dominions, forts, or factories." In order to interpret the act as only
allowing trials "in any place at sea" on the coast of territory possessed by
the King, the King's advisers had to read the statute as if the phrase
"any place at sea" were qualified by the subsequent prepositional
phrase, i.e., as if the act permitted trials "in any place at sea . . . in any
of his Majesty's islands, plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or facto212
ries." But how could a trial be conducted at sea in a fort?
In the final pages of his review, Goebel mentions some important
pieces of evidence as to colonial piracy trials that are neglected by
Crosskey. First, the Privy Council decided in 1700 that commissions
for trying pirates in America should issue under the Great Seal rather
than the seal of the Admiralty. 213 But Crosskey might have questioned
whether this decision was well known among colonial lawyers; and he
might also have argued that if it was known, any colonist who had read
the act of 1700 would have interpreted this Privy Council declaration as
a decision of policy rather than a legal imperative.
Second, Goebel cites a statute passed in 1717214 amending the act of
1700.215 Since this act is expressly extended to America,21 6 it surely
would have gained the attention of the colonists. One of the provisions
of this law states that offenses under the law of 1700 "may be tried and
judged" in the "manner and form" prescribed by the law of 1536;217
thus it sanctioned piracy trials under the common law rather than under
the Admiralty jurisdiction. But even here Crosskey might have reasoned
that the "may be" still leaves open the possibility of trials in the Admiralty Courts.
Thirdly, Goebel upbraids Crosskey for overlooking an ordinance
passed by the Continental Congress in 1781 concerning 2 8 "the trial of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas." This provided for
trials "according to the course of the common law, in like manner as if
212. I CRossKEY, supra note 1, at 452-53; 2 MARSDEN, supra note 194, at 252-55. See
Petro, supra note 9, at 341-43. It should also be noted that although the opinion of the
crown law officers was rendered in 1720, it would not have been easily known to the
colonists since it was not published until the publication of the volumes edited by
Marsden in 1915. I CpossKEY, supra note 1, at 453.
213. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 480. See 2 AcTs OF THE PRvY CoUNcIL 342
(W. Grant & I. Munro eds. 1910) (Goebel's reference to page 352 is incorrect).
214, 4 Geo. I, c. 11, § 7 (1717).
215. 11 & 12 Will. IlI, c. 7.
216. 4 Geo. I, c. 11, § 9 (1717).
217. Id. § 7.
218. ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
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the piracy or felony were committed upon the land, and
within some
'210
county, district or precinct in one of these United States.
Thus in 1787 as a matter of law the trial of piracies had been for some
years settled by congressional ordinance in the states ....
[Thus] the
provision in the Constitution was drawn. . . as a delegation of power

as against the states and not as a protection against executive power. 220
It has been argued that this evidence does not weaken Crosskey's thesis
since the ordinance was only a statutory grant to the states of a power
that belonged to the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confed-1
22
eration and thus is not a power essentially belonging to the states.
What should be our evaluation of Crosskey's interpretation of the
piracies and marine felonies provision of the Constitution? As with
many of his other arguments, Crosskey's position here is neither as
indefensible as Goebel claims nor as secure as Crosskey himself seems
to think. His interpretation of the act of 1700 as condoning the trial of
pirates in the colonies by the Admiralty Courts as a possible legal alternative to trials according to the common law, appears altogether persuasive. But since the universal practice in the colonies-as sanctioned
by the King's law officers, the Privy Council and Parliament itself-was
to try pirates only in common law courts, it seems unlikely that the
members of the Constitutional Convention would have worried that the
trying of pirates in Admiralty Courts was still part of the "standing law."
Perhaps Crosskey should have seen more significance in the similarity
of the provision in the Articles of Confederation concerning piracy trials
and the corresponding provision in the Constitution. 22 2 For does it not
seem probable that the Framers enumerated this power in Article I,
section 8, not for fear that it would otherwise be considered an "executive" power, but simply as a precaution against the view that any
enumerated power of the Continental Congress not mentioned in the
Constitution was to be denied the new Congress? Indeed Crosskey
believes that such a precaution by the Framers does explain the inclusion of some of the enumerated powers of Congress that had been
219. 19

JouRNAs OF Ta CONTiNENTAL CONGRESS 354 (G. Hunt ed. 1912).
220. Ex Parte Clio, supra note 6, at 482-83. See 19 JouRNALS OF rHE CONTINENTAL
CONGR-SS 354-56 (G. Hunt ed. 1912).
221. Petro, supra note 9, at 345.
Mhe power to define and punish piracies and marine felonies was ...
-ultimately-a power belonging to the Congress, and the power of the states in the
premises was only derivative and conditional-conditional on the continuance of the
delegation from the Congress. There was, accordingly, nothing in the form of a
basic power for the Constitution to take away from the states.
Id.
222. See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
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previously enumerated in the Articles of Confederation among the
223
powers of the Continental Congress.

I.

THE COMMON LAW iN AMERICA:

SomE CONCLUDiNG REMARKS

A proper evaluation of William Crosskey's theory of the American
reception of the English common law would demand a much more
elaborate investigation than has been done here. But at least a preliminary survey has been made of the issues that would have to be handled
in such an investigation. One issue in particular has arisen as the
central question: Can Crosskey adequately explain the emergence of
a uniform national common law out of the varied forms in which the
English common law was adopted by the colonies and the states?
Story maintained that the common law of the colonies was uniform
with respect to the "general foundation" of colonial jurisprudence but
diverse with respect to the "actual superstructure." This was consonant
with his view of the common law as having some parts that were
fundamental and unchangeable and other parts that were changeable in
response to the varying circumstances of society. Thus, despite the
legal variation among the colonies and the states, the fundamental
principles-those grounded in nature-could remain the same for all.
Even while the absence of a unified judicial system prevented their
uniform application in practice, these general legal principles existed in
potentiality; they were there to be discovered once the Constitution
established a national judicial system.
Because of Crosskey's careful avoidance of "juristic metaphysics," he
cannot accept Story's line of argument. Crosskey must ground the
common law entirely in the legal practice of America without reference
to general principles underlying this legal practice. This puts him in a
difficult situation since he admits that in the colonies there was only
"partial and approximate conformity in practice."
Crosskey is ultimately compelled to violate the principles of legal
positivism in order to explain the uniformity of the American common
law before 1787. He argues, for instance, that although the colonists
could not receive the English common law into their legal practice in a
uniform manner, they were still receptive to it; that is, they regarded
it as being in principle the general customary law of all the colonies even
when this was impossible in practice. Furthermore, the revolutionary
break from England in 1776, which permitted the thirteen states to form
223. I CnossKEY, supra note 1, at 411-13.
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their own legal systems, did not, Crosskey maintains, abolish the common law as the fundamental national law: after this first political
revolution, the common law remained in existence, at least in potentiality, until the second political revolution in 1789 allowed it to be actual-

ized in practice. The national common law did not disappear between
1776 and 1789 because it belonged to the legal history shared by all
Americans insofar as they constituted a single "people" with a common
legal heritage.

So it seems, according to this theory, that the American

people in 1789 did not make a national common law for themselves,
rather they discovered a pre-existing one. Thus, Crosskey relies on one

of the primary assumptions of the traditional theory of the common
law, unlike statutory
law-namely, that the legitimacy of the common
224
law, arises from custom rather than sovereignty.

It would appear, therefore, that although Goebel is wrong in accusing
Crosskey of being captivated by the "moonstruck nonsense" of naturallaw speculation, it may be true that any theory of the uniform adoption
of the common law before 1787 requires some appeal to the traditional
22
understanding of the common law as derived from natural law. 1

224. See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 259-98; notes 9-18 supra and accompanying text.
225. It should be remembered that Crosskey lays out his theory of the reception of the
common law solely to buttress his interpretation of the Constitution as granting to
Congress a general national legislative power. Therefore, it would seem important to
find out where the Framers of the Constitution stood on this issue concerning the nature
of the common law. That is, did they think the common law obligated men because it
was grounded in nature or because (and only insofar as) it was the creation of a supreme
legislative power? If they thought the common law existed independently of the
legislative power, and if they thought America had a national common law in 1787, then
they might well have considered this law as a source of substantive powers for the
national government. But if they thought the common law had to be created by the
legislature, then they would surely have considered any federal common law to be only
incidental to the legislative powers of Congress and therefore not a legitimate source of
substanti e powers. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
We could begin our study of the Framers' views on this point by examining James
Wilson's Lectures on Law, which are especially pertinent to the question before us since
Crosskey relies greatly on these lectures to support his theory of the national common
law.
First, Wilson accepts the traditional theory of law as based in nature. He begins his
lectures by observing: "Order, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us,
we see; within us, we feel; above us, we admire a rule, from which a deviation cannot, or
should not, or will not be made." 1 WiLsoN, supra note 35, at 97. Also, he describes
the common law as that which "contains the common dictates of nature, refined by
wisdom and experience, as occasions offer, and cases arise." Id. at 356.
However, on the other hand, Wilson's insistence that legal obligation depends on
human consent shows an inclination towards the modem theory of law as based on
human will. He even goes so far as to say that the law of nature does not bind a man
unless he consents to it, that is, unless it is sanctioned by human authority. He also
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In this paper an attempt was made to demonstrate that, contrary to

the opinions fostered by some of the reviewers of the book, Crosskey's
Politics and the Constitution is worthy of serious study.

His treatment

of the American adoption of the common law was used as an example of
the kind of argumentation found in his book. In carrying out this
project, attention was devoted primarily to answering the criticisms
made by Julius Goebel with regard to Crosskey's theory of adoption.
The fact that Crosskey's Politics and the Constitution presents a viable

theory of the adoption of the common law in the colonies is but a
single indication of the continuing validity and usefulness of the work.

gives an account of the common law that makes it consistent with the primacy of
consent. Although the common law was traditionally understood to obtain its legitimacy
by being sanctioned by custom because custom reflected the dictates of nature, Wilson
explains the customary character of the common law as the sign that men have consented
to this law; this seems very close to the view that the common law is derived from a
sovereign will rather than nature. Id. at 187, 121-22.
Hence at first glance Wilson's treatment of the common law appears to contain
elements of both the traditional and the modem theories of law. Perhaps the views of the
other members of the Constitutional Convention possess this same ambiguity, which
could be explained as the result of their attempted fusion of classical theories of law and
politics with those of modernity. But, all of this goes far beyond the limits of this
article. For a study of Wilson's theory of law.see Horwitz, supra note 20, at 311-12.

